Why I am Against the Drone War

For the current policy of drone war against suspected terrorists around the world to be morally justified it must, as a necessary condition, pass muster before the bar of at least one of the commonly accepted moral theories: consequentialism, deontology, and virtue theory.

From a consequentialist (i.e. 'ends justify the means') perspective, the drone war is justified if and only if it will result in the deaths of less people than would die if it were not pursued.  This saving of lives would occur via a combination of having prevented terror attacks that would resulted in mass casualties, saving infrastructure that is vital to the well being of people, and allowing a higher level of education in the targeted countries (this consideration would primarily apply to Pakistan and Afghanistan).  The administration and its supporters have not presented a convincing case for this net saving of lives.  There is, in fact, good reason to be skeptical that the drone war is even having a significant effect in reducing terrorism, let alone creating a net surplus of saved lives, as described in this article.  

Someone may object that the drone war costs less lives than either a full or partial invasion.  But this is a false dichotomy.  There are other options besides the drone war, including complete disengagement (i.e. dealing with terror related issues as law enforcement problems within the targeted countries) and special forces operations of the type that killed Bin Laden (which resulted in far fewer civilian casualties than a drone strike).  Both these options would likely result in less civilian casualties than are being created in the drone war.

Someone may object that the Pakistan army cannot handle the problem of terrorism by itself.  First, it is questionable whether it cannot handle terrorism or it simply will not, given the ties between Pakistani military intelligence and various extremist groups.  Second, the US cannot sustain the beat of being the policeman of the world.  It does not have the material resources nor does it have the necessary sophistication to carry out this function while avoiding large civilian casualty tolls.  Besides this, the primary goal of the drone campaign is not secure civil society in Pakistan.  The goal is to secure the US and its citizens at home and abroad.  If the moral calculus is thus narrowed, it is extremely difficult to make the case that the drone war is saving more lives than it is taking.  Pakistan, if it is to survive, needs to take care of its own security needs.  The negative social and political consequences of US military intervention are already being felt and will only worsen as the drone war continues. As long as America is giving aid to that army it should, of course, insist that certain goals are met (i.e. actually protecting its civilian population), but these goals must be met in a manner consistent with international human rights agreements that both countries recognize. Apart from that, aid aimed at revitalizing the Pakistani economy and providing for a more prosperous and educated citizenry is the best that America can do to help Pakistan in the long term.

From a deontological, or duty/rights-based, perspective, there is little that can be said in defense of the drone war.  It certainly cannot be made a universal maxim that all males of a certain age in a kill zone be treated as targets. The civilians who are killed in the course of the drone war are not being treated as ends in themselves but as mere things ('collateral damage').  The drone war has even adopted the 'double-tap' tactic long associated with terrorists in order to target aid workers and thus discourage the natural human instinct to help victims of a disaster.  The targets themselves are also denied the procedural rights that they are guaranteed by universal human rights conventions and, in some cases, by the US constitution.  This is a situation that cannot be justified by invoking the categorical imperative, the golden rule, Felix Adler's ethical maxim ("always act so as to elicit the best in others and thereby yourself"), or other accounts of ethics in terms of duty.

What can virtue theory tell us about the drone war?  In Aristotle's account, a virtue is the mid-point on a continuum of behavior the ends of which are vices.  If you donate too much to charity (i.e. to the point that it harms you and those dependent on you) you have manifested the vice of prodigality.  If you give to little, you are miserly.  If you consistently give the maximal amount that you can sustain without harming yourself or those dependent on you, you have attained the virtue of liberality.  

This scheme can be applied to the policy response to the problem of terrorism.  There is a continuum of such responses, the poles of which represent inaction to the point of criminal neglect and total destruction of the civilian areas in which terrorists pursue their campaigns.  It goes without saying that both of these poles are vicious.  The virtuous mean on this spectrum is identical to that policy that will achieve the goal effectively hampering terrorism while minimizing to the utmost civilian casualties.  The question to be asked is: Does the drone war meet this criteria?  With at least two other viable options (criminal investigation and special operations) available, both of which are likely to result in less civilian deaths than drone strikes, it is very difficult to answer that question in the affirmative.

To sum up: if the drone war is to be justified, it must be acceptable according to at least one of the generally accepted ethical theories.  A justification on deontological grounds is unlikely if not impossible, a justification on consequentialist grounds hinges on evidence that is, at the current time, doubtful at best, and a justification on the grounds of virtue theory could only be obtained after experience shows that less violent strategies have failed.  I therefore cannot support the drone war and must reject it as immoral.

A Review of A.C. Grayling's 'The God Argument'

I loved this book.  Grayling opens with a critique of religion that focuses first on the most likely historical and psychological roots of religious belief and then on the most common arguments for the existence of God.  The latter are dismantled with the precision one would expect from a philosopher.  I was particularly pleased by his discussion of Plantinga's modal version of the ontological argument.

He also deals with issue of framing the discussion between atheists and believers, noting that the use of the word God (as opposed to 'gods and goddesses' or 'Fred') as a proper noun conveys a sense of gravitas to theological discourse to which it is not entitled.  It also obscures what is really going on in the standard pro-theistic arguments by creating the illusion that they are about something more substantive than a something-we-know-not-what.

The second part of the book moves beyond the negation of religion and argues for the adoption of Humanism as a life stance.  Humanism affirms the centrality of human experience in understanding ethical values and posits the flourishing of human beings as the goal of ethical action.  After elucidating what he means by humanism, Grayling proceeds to describe the elements that make up a good life.  He then moves on to more specific issues, such as human sexuality, abortion, drug use, and euthanasia.  He closes with a contrast between the religious and humanistic views of the world and concludes that all that is good in the former is present in the latter, while the negative qualities of the former are avoided.

This is a welcome addition to literature on atheism and to the current ongoing debate on the place of religion in public life.  Atheism as such is negative- it is nothing more or less than a lack of belief in gods and goddesses.  Much of the atheistic literature focuses on the absurdities and harmful effects of religion.  This is good and necessary, as far as it goes, but it brings me pleasure to see authors moving on to discuss the next step beyond the rejection of religion- the affirmation of the life of this world.

Allah, Goodness and Justice

"Theologians have always taught that God's decrees are good, and that this is not a mere tautology: it follows that goodness is logically independent of God's decrees."- Bertrand Russell


If there is no conceivable state of affairs that would force you to admit that, in this case, Allah has acted unjustly or in a manner contrary to the good, then you have denuded the concepts of goodness and justice of meaning.  For example, Al Ghazali informs us that "harm is not conceivable from Allah - the High - because He does not encounter any ownership of other than Himself, in which His dealing could be described to be harmful" and "He is able to bring upon His creatures all manner of torture and to try them with all kinds of pain and affliction. Even if He should do this, it would be justice from Him, it would not be vile, it would not be tyrannous." 

Justice is intimately bound up with the concept of rights; a common definition of what it is to be just is to observe the rights of others.  In  a situation where there are no rights at issue, there can be no justice.

As for the good, we humans generally understand good people to be hose who are beneficent to others and avoid harming them.  Leaving aside the question of whether Allah is in fact good according to this definition (and the prevalence of 'natural evil' such as earthquakes and tornadoes should make one doubt it), can the claim that 'no matter what Allah does, he is good' be squared with any definition of the good that we would otherwise accept, independent of theology?  I doubt that it can.  To claim that Allah could torture babies for eternity and still be considered good or to conceive of this as something other than a harm, is to misunderstand what is meant by the word good. 

If a word can be applied to describe any conceivable state of affairs, it is meaningless.  Given that Muslims apply the words 'good' and 'just' to Allah's actions without consideration of what these actions may be, they apply these terms incorrectly, without regard to their meaning.  They thus render them meaningless.  Such nihilism in regards to basic ethical terms (one shared by many fundamentalist Christians and others), once it seeps into the deep structure of a mind, prepares it to commit horrors.

Response to Ghilan on Evolution

A couple of months ago, Mohamed Ghilan published a blog post in response to a conference in the UK entitled “Have Muslims Misunderstood Evolution?” I have take issue with his characterizations of atheists, his description of the history of epistemology in Western philosophy, and his depiction of the context and function of evolution in the history of ideas.


We’ll start with his invocation of the trope of the ‘angry atheist.’  This is simply insult, not rational argument.  There are, of course, many intellectuals who have taken upon themselves the education of the public about evolutionary theory.  They have published many books, given many lectures.  The tone of these materials is generally calm and professional.  There is sometimes exasperation, but this tends to be caused by the fondness with which Creationists use out of context quotes to attempt to frame a narrative of  a ‘theory in crisis.’  One would expect that Ghilan would be the last person to stereotype another group of people as ‘angry.’  As it is, atheists do not hold violent protests outside of the Creation Museum nor do they call for the assassination of those who criticize evolution in the public square.  As we all know, the case is quite different when someone violates the ‘sanctity’ of the person of Muhammad.


Towards the beginning of the article, after the slurs, he notes:

“Everyone seems to want to talk about the evidence for or against it. No one is interested in the foundation that it’s built upon, and the subsequent logic and coherence of the theory itself.”

Given that the question is itself (in this particular case) whether it is in fact the case that humans share a common ancestor with all other living species, it is rather obvious that people would want to discuss the evidence for and against the proposition.  The problem for Ghilan, as he himself admits is that Muslims:

“proceed to point out whatever holes the theory has and what it doesn’t explain. Well, if history is any guide, those holes will be filled at some point as the theory goes through the normal scientific course of being re-worked, and some clever scientists will come eventually to explain those things that haven’t been explained”

Unable to win a case on the merits (i.e. the evidence), he proceeds to argue the technicalities.  He proceeds to give an adequate account of the difference between material and inferred evidence and provides a passable account of the various criteria a theory has to satisfy to be accepted as scientific (although I am a bit put off by his putting the words objective reality in scare quotes).

He assures us that “Material evidence presents no problems for Islam.”  Perhaps.  But that is primarily because what he calls material evidence (“ the hard data,” “observed phenomena”) does not tell us very much about the world unless it is integrated into an elaborated body of theory.

He begins his discussion of the underlying foundations of evolutionary theory with an overly-simplistic account of the history of epistemology in the Western world.  He informs us that

“What the Western intellectual crowd determined for itself was that all that exists is what we can touch, smell, feel, taste, hear, and see.”

This is, of course, completely false.  That western intellectual crowd, while holding a great diversity of philosophical views, does generally believe that things such as numbers, logical truths, and the past exist (although we can find exceptions to belief in each of these).

He continues:

“ There’s no such thing as pure reason. To be rational means to make empirically-verifiable statements. “

Again, completely false, as any first year student of philosophy could tell you. He completely ignores the analytic-synthetic distinction.   While it is true that deductive arguments do not reveal new truths about the external world, they do organize the truths we do know in new ways and draw out their implications.  As A. C. Grayling writes, “There is no logical novelty in the conclusion, though often enough there is psychological novelty” (The God Argument).  One cannot be rational if they ignore the results of sound deductive arguments that are relevant to what is being discussed.  He also caricatures Descartes skepticism.  I think Pierce said it best:

“We cannot begin with complete doubt. We must begun with all the prejudices which we actually have when we enter upon the study of philosophy. These prejudices cannot be dispelled by a maxim, for they are things which it does not occur to us can be questioned. Hence this initial skepticism will be mere self-deception, and not real doubt”

Descartes doubt was a thought-experiment through which he attempted to derive indubitable first principles on which he could build up an edifice of knowledge.  Once the foundation was set, empirical evidence could be accepted, analyzed, and employed.  The other rationalist philosophers thought similarly- a Platonic skepticism towards sense perception as a source of knowledge as such is not a prominent feature of modern rationalism.  Conversely, the empiricists did not deny the utility of ‘pure reason’ as exemplified by mathematics and formal logic in analyzing the data of sense perception.  They simply rejected the doctrine that the ultimate foundation of knowledge consists of a series of rationally intuited indubitable truths.  Instead, they posited the evidence of the senses as the foundation of knowledge.  The dispute did not consist of one side rejecting an entire avenue of knowledge that was accepted by the other- it was a debate over the ultimate foundations of or justification for knowledge.

By contrast, Ghilan tells us that “The Muslim approach was never an either/or in this extremist sense.”  There was, of course, no Muslim approach as such.  There were a diverse array of thinkers in the Muslim world who dealt with epistemology and they reached conclusions that were just as diverse as those in the west.  Al-Ghazali, for example, ultimately drew skeptical conclusions concerning both the use of the senses AND demonstrative reason, and was only released from his doubt  “by a light that God almighty cast into my breast, which is the key to the greater part of cognizance" (Deliverer from Error).  As for western approaches to overcoming this dichotomy, there have been many from Immanuel Kant’s categories of thought, through the American pragmatists such as Pierce and James, to the modern anti-foundationalist thinkers.

Ghilan then takes a card from the deck of the Christian creationists- he decides that the issue is not one of science but of religious worldviews.  He cites Dawkin’s oft-quoted (by fundamentalists) passage about Darwin making “it possible to be an intellectually fulfilled atheist” as evidence that “evolutionary theory is meant for” justifying atheism and that “major function of evolutionary theory... is to provide a pacifier for the reader who might have any inclinations to feeling any reverence towards anything metaphysical.”  This is belied by the actual historical facts concerning the genesis (if you pardon the pun) of the theory and by the numerous religious scientists who accept the theory because of its scientific merits, such as its fit with the empirical evidence its explanatory power, fruitfulness in generating research projects, and.  Darwin himself tells us in his Autobiography that “  Whilst on board the Beagle I was quite orthodox, and I remember being heartily laughed at by several of the officers (though themselves orthodox) for quoting the Bible as an unanswerable authority on some point of morality.... The old argument of design in nature, as given by Paley, which formerly seemed to me so conclusive, fails, now that the law of natural selection has been discovered” (p. 85-87).

Ultimately, the problem for Ghilan, as it is with creationists such as Phillip E. Johnson, is philosophical naturalism, described by the former as the “assumption that there is nothing beyond this physical realm, and “ that “give[s] a context to the combination of your material and inferred evidence.”  Once this is assumed, he admits that “you cannot escape having to accept evolutionary theory as an account for where things came from.”  Indeed.

Ghilan’s problem is that philosophical naturalism, in its epistemological form, is a necessary precondition for the scientific endeavor.  You cannot frame general laws and theories concerning the physical world which invoke entities that are not subject to the laws of that world and that can flout them at will.  Once you allow evil genies (ala Descartes) or gods and goddesses fudge the results by speeding up the decay rates of radioactive elements or tweaking the speed of light, you’ve said goodbye to any confidence you can have in general scientific theories concerning the past.

Besides this concern, it deserves mention that the existence of this physical realm is a shared assumption of common sense, scientific investigation, and the Abrahamic religions.  To move beyond it and assert the existence of a supernatural realm and to invoke supernatural explanations of natural phenomena is a step that needs to be argued for.  It is not basic in the same way as the assertion that the physical world exists.  Ghilan is correct that we cannot evaluate evidence without first principles- but not all first principles are created equal.

He makes the claim that:

“If one were to take all the assertions such as “this evolved from that to solve the problem of moving from water to land”, and restrict the material to just describing structure and function and pointing out the similarities without inducing relatedness, and classify based on similarity rather than “relatedness”, it wouldn’t all of a sudden be any less scientific.”

Besides demonstrating an extreme misunderstanding about evolutionary theory (features do not evolve to solve problems ala Lamarck- new features emerge which incidentally allow organisms to exploit new niches), Ghilan is omitting that science is, at heart, a theorizing activity that moves beyond the given evidence to infer explanations for that evidence which can then be tested in some manner or other. It is not, as Taner Edis put it in describing the peculiar view of science held by Muslim creationists,  “a set of practical applications and concrete facts to be collected and organized like stamps.”(An Illussion of Harmony)

He proceeds to create a farcical and condescending dialogue intended to show how close-minded and dogmatic atheists are, quotes a passage from two authors who are not actually denying the fact of evolution but rather the explanatory power of natural selection, and then embarks on a rant about “all the problems seeping from evolutionary theory” (which he does not describe), invoking (of course) Kuhn about all theory being data laden and in which he alludes to the “foundations” of “the science-worshipping militant new atheist crowd” being shook (how?), before ending on an appeal for Muslims to take up the study of traditional theology.  Yes, I’m sure that will work.

Beyond Irony, Beyond Islam

"A confession has to be part of your new life. -Wittgenstein"

Since starting this blog, I've come to realize that my I can no longer in good faith affirm that Islam is of supernatural origin.  From my studies, I have concluded that it is completely explicable in natural and cultural terms.  I do not see the Qur'an as a divine incursion into the natural world.  It is a human document.  It has poetic beauty and practical wisdom, as do many scriptures revered by one or another section of humanity.  Like these other scriptures, it also contains many things that are morally unacceptable and much that is simply factually incorrect, besides.  Despite that, I still appreciate many aspects of Muslim culture- I like eid, I appreciate the literature produced across time throughout the Muslim world.  I am still intensely interested in what is commonly termed 'Muslim' philosophy and in the Arabic language.  And I love the food. I will, as before, oppose racism, xenophobia, and social injustice, whether directed at Muslims or non-Muslims.  But I can no longer affirm the shahadatayn, I can no longer pray, and I can no longer observe the fast of Ramadan as anything other than a method of training the will and of learning deeper empathy for the needy.  Sadaqah is still a cardinal virtue, as any humanist will affirm. I will be taking time to detail some of my criticism in detail but this very brief statement will be sufficient for now.

The Book of Jihad

Excerpted from Qadi Abu Muhammad Abdul Wahhaab ibn Ali al-Baghdaadi's "At-Talqeen fil fiqhil Maliki" (The Instruction in Malik's Jurisprudence)

Purpose:  The purpose of this translation is to present an authentic and reliable source for the Sunni view of Jihad.  It is intended as a contribution to the current dialectic which posits that Jihad is either the free-for-all of homicidal terrorism described by the Islamophobes or the purely spiritual, sweetness-and-light struggle posited by the Muslim apologists.  It is neither.  Jihad is in some ways similar to the "just war" of Catholicism, but broader in scope and open ended.  It neither encourages the killing of civilians nor does it prohibit it entirely.  It certainly does not conform with modern standards of international law but it is not lawless.  It is also quite clear from the classical texts, such as the one presently translated, that it is neither obligatory on each and every Muslim nor something that can be entirely abandoned.  Between the extremes of the dialectic we can find the truth.

The author of this blog believes firmly in non-violence, except in strict self-defense.  Terrorism, pre-emptive war, slavery, apartheid, and occupation, along with most of the tactics, strategies, and weapons used in modern warfare, are morally repugnant and ought to be rejected, regardless of what any religion says.

Note on the translation: This translation is based on Darul Kutubil 'Ilmiyyah edition published in 1999.  The text begins on pg. 68. Being a student, and not a master, of Arabic, I welcome any corrections to my translation, provided permission is given to publish them with credit according to the terms of this blog's Creative Commons license. I have tried to render this translation into idiomatic English because keeping to the formal structure of the book would inhibit clarity. I have summarized rather than translated the section on the conditions for participating in the spoils due to lack of contemporary relevance. Anyone interested in this particular topic can consult Aisha Bewley's translation of the Risalah.

Jihad is a communal obligation* and is incumbent, some of the time, on those who face the enemy. It is not permissible to abandon it entirely in truce except from an excuse. He (the Mujahid**) does not desist from the enemy except that they embrace Islam or enter into our pact (dhimma) and hand over the poll-tax (djizya) in our abode. It is desirable that they are called to Islam before fighting them except that they swiftly descend upon us. It is permissible to harm the enemy via all possible means from among the following: burning of the planted gardens and of fodder, cutting date-palms and trees, wounding animals, and destruction of the country side. Do not touch the bees unless they are numerous. In that case the consensus transmits their destruction.

The spoils are divided in five, all of it, it’s substance and its incidentals, equally, except the gardens, for they are left as pious endowments (awqaaf). Looting and the like are, without distinction, not favoured during fighting except with the permission of the leader (Imam) when he deems that appropriate. The leader takes from the spoils one fifth (al-khums) of it and distributes among the army four fifths of it. It is not permissible to steal from the war booty before it is distributed and the doer of that is punished. His saddlebag is not burned and his portion is not forbidden. The army may eat the food, slaughter the livestock, and take the fodder of the enemy without the permission of the leader. The leader does not reckon it among the spoils.

...


[The author here gives the conditions for participating in the spoils, including that it was gained by fighting or at least by "the exertion of horses" and that it may be distributed to those who are part of the army but did not fight due to sickness and the like. Also, the shares due to cavalrymen and infantry are described. ]

…

Women and youths are not killed nor are very old men, nor hermits nor monks, unless harm or a ruse is feared from them. And their wealth is given back if they are many and what was left for them is only a little.

Protection of the enemy commanders is legally valid. Protection of other than them from the rest of mankind, according to Malik (Allah have mercy on him!), is also valid and their destruction is not permitted. And he also said: “To them [commanders in the Jihad] is the right to permit it or deny it. And when it is permitted it is all the same whether it is a man or a woman, or slave or free adult or adolescent."

In regards to captives, the leader has a choice in the disposition of one fifth. The choices are: killing them, enslaving them, freeing them as a gift or ransoming them, and contracting a covenant. In regards to spies and to the return of hostages, the leader exercises independent reasoning (ijtihad). If they become Muslims, then he who became Muslim is entitled to a settlement and he has the right of possession of his land. And he who became Muslim after his land was forcibly conquered, then it is of the spoils and not returned to them with his Islam. The leader secures it to whoever he deems appropriate. He takes its land tax from he who possesses it. The commandments of booty, the leader's fifth, the land-tax, and poll-tax are one; the leader takes his business from it without assessment and returns the remainder in consolation of the Muslims, and he gives the first quarter from it according to his independent reasoning.






Notes:


*-A Communal Obligation (fard kifayyah) is an act that must be performed by at least one member of the community else the whole community is sinful.

**-Mujahid is the active participle (ismul faa3il) of jaahada, meaning "to endeavor, strive; to fight...; to wage holy war against the infidels" according Hans Wehr. One who engages in Jihad is a mujahid.

Islam and Female Genital Mutilation

While not as much in the news lately as it has been in the past, Female Genital Mutilation is still a scourge of women worldwide.  Muslim apologists have repeatedly claimed that this practice is strictly cultural and has nothing to do with Islam as a religion. For example, the Muslim Women's League informs us that "According to Sayyid Sabiq, renowned scholar and author of Fiqh-us-Sunnah, all hadiths concerning female circumcision are non-authentic."  Shaykh Tantawi and Shaykh Ali Gomaa of Al-Azhar were both against the practice.

But what is the reality?  When we examine classical, relied upon texts on Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh), another picture emerges.  In Umdat as-Salik, translated as the "Reliance of the Traveler" we find that "Circumcision is obligatory... for both men and women." In the Risalah of Ibn Abi Zayd al-Qayrawani, a core text of the Maliki school of fiqh, it is recorded that circumcision for women is "honourable."  Notably, the translation for the commentary on male circumcision was provided while the commentary on female circumcision was omitted.  It gives some detail as to what is required and so I have decided to translate it myself.  The commentator, Shaykh Saalih Abdus Samee al-Azhari, tells us that "[Circumcision [literally: reduction] in women] And it is cutting the protuberance at the top of the vulva that is like the comb of the rooster. [is honourable] ... with the meaning that it is desirable."  Quite colourful.

What of the modern inheritors of the classical tradition?  Shaykha Shazia at Sunnipath tells us that "Female circumcision is it itself obligatory in the Shafi`i school, and Shaykh Nuh Keller’s translation in the Reliance of the Traveler is accurate and defines the meaning well. She emphasizes that the clitoris should not be completely cut off and laments " that the correct practice has become an almost-lost art."  Abu Haleema at the Hanafi Fiqh Blog informs us that the practice is "sunnah" according to "the view of the Hanafis and Maalikis, and [this] was narrated in one report from Ahmad." This is after giving an over view of the textual evidence in favor of the practice. The Guiding Helper, a modern Maliki fiqh text, defines circumcision as "the removal of the foreskin at the head of the penis or the small cap that covers the clitoris)" (Footnote 2186) and notes that "it is a fadilah (weaker mandub) to remove the small cap over the clitoris in females (of all ages).  [Nothing more than this small cap should be cut.]  Please note that cutting this small cap usually does not affect the ability of the female to reach orgasm (and by cutting this cap, the female will be able to get mandub credit in the next world for having performing circumcision)" (Footnote 2188).

What is one to make of all this?  First, the practice of cutting the sexual organs of women is definitely an Islamic practice.  It is not merely cultural and is either obligatory or encouraged in all of the four schools of law.  Second, the cutting countenance by the shariah is limited (it is not removal of the whole clitoris) and does not include common practices such as sewing up the vagina.  Some critics have maintained that Shaykh Nuh was being dishonest in his translation and that the text literally means to "cut off the clitoris."  The Arabic verb qaTa3a means both to cut and to cut off, among other things, but the Shaykh is drawing on the entire tradition of Shafi'i scholarship to which he is heir.  The intended audience of the Reliance is the body of English speaking Muslims, not non-Muslims, so I don't think there is a reason to be deceptive because this would constitute misleading fellow Muslims.  If his intent was to sugar-coat the issue, he would have simply removed the material entirely or left it untranslated, such as he did with the section of the Umdat that deals with slavery.
But, it must be said, the insistence of modern Shuyookh such as Faraz Rabani, that the practice is no longer recommended (besides being questionable from a fiqhi standpoint) implies that they recognize the abuses that can come out of even this limited permission to cut.  The question is, given that the proper procedure has become a "lost art" and horrendous abuse is rampant, why would any scholars recommend it all?  Is adherence to medieval formulations of religious law worth all the (female) suffering that results?