Why I am Against the Drone War

For the current policy of drone war against suspected terrorists around the world to be morally justified it must, as a necessary condition, pass muster before the bar of at least one of the commonly accepted moral theories: consequentialism, deontology, and virtue theory.

From a consequentialist (i.e. 'ends justify the means') perspective, the drone war is justified if and only if it will result in the deaths of less people than would die if it were not pursued.  This saving of lives would occur via a combination of having prevented terror attacks that would resulted in mass casualties, saving infrastructure that is vital to the well being of people, and allowing a higher level of education in the targeted countries (this consideration would primarily apply to Pakistan and Afghanistan).  The administration and its supporters have not presented a convincing case for this net saving of lives.  There is, in fact, good reason to be skeptical that the drone war is even having a significant effect in reducing terrorism, let alone creating a net surplus of saved lives, as described in this article.  

Someone may object that the drone war costs less lives than either a full or partial invasion.  But this is a false dichotomy.  There are other options besides the drone war, including complete disengagement (i.e. dealing with terror related issues as law enforcement problems within the targeted countries) and special forces operations of the type that killed Bin Laden (which resulted in far fewer civilian casualties than a drone strike).  Both these options would likely result in less civilian casualties than are being created in the drone war.

Someone may object that the Pakistan army cannot handle the problem of terrorism by itself.  First, it is questionable whether it cannot handle terrorism or it simply will not, given the ties between Pakistani military intelligence and various extremist groups.  Second, the US cannot sustain the beat of being the policeman of the world.  It does not have the material resources nor does it have the necessary sophistication to carry out this function while avoiding large civilian casualty tolls.  Besides this, the primary goal of the drone campaign is not secure civil society in Pakistan.  The goal is to secure the US and its citizens at home and abroad.  If the moral calculus is thus narrowed, it is extremely difficult to make the case that the drone war is saving more lives than it is taking.  Pakistan, if it is to survive, needs to take care of its own security needs.  The negative social and political consequences of US military intervention are already being felt and will only worsen as the drone war continues. As long as America is giving aid to that army it should, of course, insist that certain goals are met (i.e. actually protecting its civilian population), but these goals must be met in a manner consistent with international human rights agreements that both countries recognize. Apart from that, aid aimed at revitalizing the Pakistani economy and providing for a more prosperous and educated citizenry is the best that America can do to help Pakistan in the long term.

From a deontological, or duty/rights-based, perspective, there is little that can be said in defense of the drone war.  It certainly cannot be made a universal maxim that all males of a certain age in a kill zone be treated as targets. The civilians who are killed in the course of the drone war are not being treated as ends in themselves but as mere things ('collateral damage').  The drone war has even adopted the 'double-tap' tactic long associated with terrorists in order to target aid workers and thus discourage the natural human instinct to help victims of a disaster.  The targets themselves are also denied the procedural rights that they are guaranteed by universal human rights conventions and, in some cases, by the US constitution.  This is a situation that cannot be justified by invoking the categorical imperative, the golden rule, Felix Adler's ethical maxim ("always act so as to elicit the best in others and thereby yourself"), or other accounts of ethics in terms of duty.

What can virtue theory tell us about the drone war?  In Aristotle's account, a virtue is the mid-point on a continuum of behavior the ends of which are vices.  If you donate too much to charity (i.e. to the point that it harms you and those dependent on you) you have manifested the vice of prodigality.  If you give to little, you are miserly.  If you consistently give the maximal amount that you can sustain without harming yourself or those dependent on you, you have attained the virtue of liberality.  

This scheme can be applied to the policy response to the problem of terrorism.  There is a continuum of such responses, the poles of which represent inaction to the point of criminal neglect and total destruction of the civilian areas in which terrorists pursue their campaigns.  It goes without saying that both of these poles are vicious.  The virtuous mean on this spectrum is identical to that policy that will achieve the goal effectively hampering terrorism while minimizing to the utmost civilian casualties.  The question to be asked is: Does the drone war meet this criteria?  With at least two other viable options (criminal investigation and special operations) available, both of which are likely to result in less civilian deaths than drone strikes, it is very difficult to answer that question in the affirmative.

To sum up: if the drone war is to be justified, it must be acceptable according to at least one of the generally accepted ethical theories.  A justification on deontological grounds is unlikely if not impossible, a justification on consequentialist grounds hinges on evidence that is, at the current time, doubtful at best, and a justification on the grounds of virtue theory could only be obtained after experience shows that less violent strategies have failed.  I therefore cannot support the drone war and must reject it as immoral.

A Review of A.C. Grayling's 'The God Argument'

I loved this book.  Grayling opens with a critique of religion that focuses first on the most likely historical and psychological roots of religious belief and then on the most common arguments for the existence of God.  The latter are dismantled with the precision one would expect from a philosopher.  I was particularly pleased by his discussion of Plantinga's modal version of the ontological argument.

He also deals with issue of framing the discussion between atheists and believers, noting that the use of the word God (as opposed to 'gods and goddesses' or 'Fred') as a proper noun conveys a sense of gravitas to theological discourse to which it is not entitled.  It also obscures what is really going on in the standard pro-theistic arguments by creating the illusion that they are about something more substantive than a something-we-know-not-what.

The second part of the book moves beyond the negation of religion and argues for the adoption of Humanism as a life stance.  Humanism affirms the centrality of human experience in understanding ethical values and posits the flourishing of human beings as the goal of ethical action.  After elucidating what he means by humanism, Grayling proceeds to describe the elements that make up a good life.  He then moves on to more specific issues, such as human sexuality, abortion, drug use, and euthanasia.  He closes with a contrast between the religious and humanistic views of the world and concludes that all that is good in the former is present in the latter, while the negative qualities of the former are avoided.

This is a welcome addition to literature on atheism and to the current ongoing debate on the place of religion in public life.  Atheism as such is negative- it is nothing more or less than a lack of belief in gods and goddesses.  Much of the atheistic literature focuses on the absurdities and harmful effects of religion.  This is good and necessary, as far as it goes, but it brings me pleasure to see authors moving on to discuss the next step beyond the rejection of religion- the affirmation of the life of this world.

Allah, Goodness and Justice

"Theologians have always taught that God's decrees are good, and that this is not a mere tautology: it follows that goodness is logically independent of God's decrees."- Bertrand Russell


If there is no conceivable state of affairs that would force you to admit that, in this case, Allah has acted unjustly or in a manner contrary to the good, then you have denuded the concepts of goodness and justice of meaning.  For example, Al Ghazali informs us that "harm is not conceivable from Allah - the High - because He does not encounter any ownership of other than Himself, in which His dealing could be described to be harmful" and "He is able to bring upon His creatures all manner of torture and to try them with all kinds of pain and affliction. Even if He should do this, it would be justice from Him, it would not be vile, it would not be tyrannous." 

Justice is intimately bound up with the concept of rights; a common definition of what it is to be just is to observe the rights of others.  In  a situation where there are no rights at issue, there can be no justice.

As for the good, we humans generally understand good people to be hose who are beneficent to others and avoid harming them.  Leaving aside the question of whether Allah is in fact good according to this definition (and the prevalence of 'natural evil' such as earthquakes and tornadoes should make one doubt it), can the claim that 'no matter what Allah does, he is good' be squared with any definition of the good that we would otherwise accept, independent of theology?  I doubt that it can.  To claim that Allah could torture babies for eternity and still be considered good or to conceive of this as something other than a harm, is to misunderstand what is meant by the word good. 

If a word can be applied to describe any conceivable state of affairs, it is meaningless.  Given that Muslims apply the words 'good' and 'just' to Allah's actions without consideration of what these actions may be, they apply these terms incorrectly, without regard to their meaning.  They thus render them meaningless.  Such nihilism in regards to basic ethical terms (one shared by many fundamentalist Christians and others), once it seeps into the deep structure of a mind, prepares it to commit horrors.

The Book of Jihad

Excerpted from Qadi Abu Muhammad Abdul Wahhaab ibn Ali al-Baghdaadi's "At-Talqeen fil fiqhil Maliki" (The Instruction in Malik's Jurisprudence)

Purpose:  The purpose of this translation is to present an authentic and reliable source for the Sunni view of Jihad.  It is intended as a contribution to the current dialectic which posits that Jihad is either the free-for-all of homicidal terrorism described by the Islamophobes or the purely spiritual, sweetness-and-light struggle posited by the Muslim apologists.  It is neither.  Jihad is in some ways similar to the "just war" of Catholicism, but broader in scope and open ended.  It neither encourages the killing of civilians nor does it prohibit it entirely.  It certainly does not conform with modern standards of international law but it is not lawless.  It is also quite clear from the classical texts, such as the one presently translated, that it is neither obligatory on each and every Muslim nor something that can be entirely abandoned.  Between the extremes of the dialectic we can find the truth.

The author of this blog believes firmly in non-violence, except in strict self-defense.  Terrorism, pre-emptive war, slavery, apartheid, and occupation, along with most of the tactics, strategies, and weapons used in modern warfare, are morally repugnant and ought to be rejected, regardless of what any religion says.

Note on the translation: This translation is based on Darul Kutubil 'Ilmiyyah edition published in 1999.  The text begins on pg. 68. Being a student, and not a master, of Arabic, I welcome any corrections to my translation, provided permission is given to publish them with credit according to the terms of this blog's Creative Commons license. I have tried to render this translation into idiomatic English because keeping to the formal structure of the book would inhibit clarity. I have summarized rather than translated the section on the conditions for participating in the spoils due to lack of contemporary relevance. Anyone interested in this particular topic can consult Aisha Bewley's translation of the Risalah.

Jihad is a communal obligation* and is incumbent, some of the time, on those who face the enemy. It is not permissible to abandon it entirely in truce except from an excuse. He (the Mujahid**) does not desist from the enemy except that they embrace Islam or enter into our pact (dhimma) and hand over the poll-tax (djizya) in our abode. It is desirable that they are called to Islam before fighting them except that they swiftly descend upon us. It is permissible to harm the enemy via all possible means from among the following: burning of the planted gardens and of fodder, cutting date-palms and trees, wounding animals, and destruction of the country side. Do not touch the bees unless they are numerous. In that case the consensus transmits their destruction.

The spoils are divided in five, all of it, it’s substance and its incidentals, equally, except the gardens, for they are left as pious endowments (awqaaf). Looting and the like are, without distinction, not favoured during fighting except with the permission of the leader (Imam) when he deems that appropriate. The leader takes from the spoils one fifth (al-khums) of it and distributes among the army four fifths of it. It is not permissible to steal from the war booty before it is distributed and the doer of that is punished. His saddlebag is not burned and his portion is not forbidden. The army may eat the food, slaughter the livestock, and take the fodder of the enemy without the permission of the leader. The leader does not reckon it among the spoils.

...


[The author here gives the conditions for participating in the spoils, including that it was gained by fighting or at least by "the exertion of horses" and that it may be distributed to those who are part of the army but did not fight due to sickness and the like. Also, the shares due to cavalrymen and infantry are described. ]

…

Women and youths are not killed nor are very old men, nor hermits nor monks, unless harm or a ruse is feared from them. And their wealth is given back if they are many and what was left for them is only a little.

Protection of the enemy commanders is legally valid. Protection of other than them from the rest of mankind, according to Malik (Allah have mercy on him!), is also valid and their destruction is not permitted. And he also said: “To them [commanders in the Jihad] is the right to permit it or deny it. And when it is permitted it is all the same whether it is a man or a woman, or slave or free adult or adolescent."

In regards to captives, the leader has a choice in the disposition of one fifth. The choices are: killing them, enslaving them, freeing them as a gift or ransoming them, and contracting a covenant. In regards to spies and to the return of hostages, the leader exercises independent reasoning (ijtihad). If they become Muslims, then he who became Muslim is entitled to a settlement and he has the right of possession of his land. And he who became Muslim after his land was forcibly conquered, then it is of the spoils and not returned to them with his Islam. The leader secures it to whoever he deems appropriate. He takes its land tax from he who possesses it. The commandments of booty, the leader's fifth, the land-tax, and poll-tax are one; the leader takes his business from it without assessment and returns the remainder in consolation of the Muslims, and he gives the first quarter from it according to his independent reasoning.






Notes:


*-A Communal Obligation (fard kifayyah) is an act that must be performed by at least one member of the community else the whole community is sinful.

**-Mujahid is the active participle (ismul faa3il) of jaahada, meaning "to endeavor, strive; to fight...; to wage holy war against the infidels" according Hans Wehr. One who engages in Jihad is a mujahid.

Returning to Irony

After an absence of several months, I all but shut down this blog, deleting all of its entries and posting a short mea culpa. My heart wavers before the blows of opposing arguments, now swaying one way, now swaying another. But each time I return to my skepticism I am more vehement in it. My previous arguments (now restored to this blog) I maintain more forcefully. I will expand on them as time permits.

What occasions this change? Anger. Anger at having been sold a bill of goods. Anger at my own lack of critical thought. Anger at believing apologists.

Anger at the instructions given by Shabbir Ahmed Usmani in his commentary on 34th ayay of Suratan Nisaa’ that, when beating one’s wife for being “impudent or discourteous or impolite” that “the beating should not be serious- short of bone fracture.” Again, “the beating should not be so serious that the bone is fractured, nor the blow should be so hard that it may smite a wound leaving a scar after healing.” He admonishes us that “Every fault has its own degree [of beating]” and that “if there is any big fault on the part of woman [sic], then there is no sin or fault in beating” (Volume I. pg. 335) provided that she has been first admonished and then, if she persists, been abandoned sexually. Only after these first two measures have failed does the Shaikh, in his magnanimity to the women, recognize that beating is permissible. This was all prefaced by a discussion of the “natural” and “material” reasons for the superiority of men over women, reasons such as the “fact that man is superior to woman in knowledge and action- and the whole sociology (sic) is controlled by this one single fact” (ibid., pg. 334-335). These are not the obscure writings of a back water Shaykh. These statements are found in a tafseer of the Qur’an famous throughout the sub-continent, written by a scholar of world-wide renown and a major figure within the Deobandi movement.

Anger at the double standards displayed by Muslims activists. I am still opposed to Zionism, just as I am opposed to all forms of colonialism and racism. But the attitude of Islamic activists on the issue of Palestine disturbs me. While rightfully decrying the destruction of the olive trees and confiscation of land that the Israeli Army practices, acts which are against international law and any morality with pretensions towards universality, they ignore the fact that these types of actions are allowed in Jihad. The Talqeen, a relied upon manual of fiqh (jurisprudence) within the Maliki school of thought, states that burning planted gardens, cutting trees and date palms, wounding animals, and destruction of the country are all permissible in Jihad. A condemnation of Isaeli actions cannot be based upon Islamic morality because this morality countenences these acts when performed by Muslims against non-Muslims. An Islamic condemnation can therefore be nothing but tribal and thus unworthy of support by anyone with a critical mind. Similarly, there has been much justified anger in the Muslim world at the practice of extra-judicial killings and drone assassinations by the US, actions which frequently result in the deaths of civilians (euphemistically referred to as 'collateral damage'). The case here is the same as that of the Palestine: I condemn these actions as immoral, striking against the very notion of the rule of law and due process. This condemnation, however, is a product of a secular process of critical moral deliberation. The Islamic critique, in so far as it is traditional and not itself a product of secular modernity, can only be tribal: it is wrong for them to do it to us, but not for us to do it for them. This issue can be considered under two headings: a.) the permissibility of extra-judicial killing in Islam and b.) the permissibility of undertaking military action when it is known that this will result in civilian deaths. Both of these types of actions can be established from sound Islamic sources. The first is established from the assassinations that were ordered by the Prophet of Islam against his enemies such as Ka'b ibn al-Ashruf and Abu Rafi’. These are all mentioned in reliable sources such as Al-Bukhari. The second is established from a hadeeth in Bukhari which is as follows:

Volume 4, Book 52, Number 256:

Narrated As-Sab bin Jaththama:

The Prophet passed by me at a place called Al-Abwa or Waddan, and was asked whether it was permissible to attack the pagan warriors at night with the probability of exposing their women and children to danger. The Prophet replied, "They (i.e. women and children) are from them (i.e. pagans)." I also heard the Prophet saying, "The institution of Hima is invalid except for Allah and His Apostle."

A similar hadeeth can be found in Muslim:

Muslim Book 019,Number 4322:

It is narrated by Sa'b b. Jaththama that he said (to the Holy Prophet): Messenger of Allah, we kill the children of the polytheists during the night raids. He said: They are from them."

Note, however, that I am not claiming that these narrations are used to justify suicide bombings or the like; they are sufficient, however, to establish that the likelihood of collateral damage is not sufficient for a military operation to become impermissible under Islamic Law (see http://www.load-islam.com/artical_det.php?artical_id=414&subsection=Misconceptions#29 for a more detailed discussion of this). It is hypocritical for Muslims to condemn the US (or Israel, for that matter) for an action that would be permissible if Muslims carried out themselves. The only way to avoid this hypocrisy is to posit a universal ethical framework that applies to both Muslims and non-Muslims alike.

Anger over women being forced to veil. According to the Hanafi, Maliki, and Shafi’i jurists, the face veil is obligatory. Not something that the apologists like to mentioned, to the annoyance of traditionalists such as Ustadh Abdus Shakur Brooks and Abu Layth. Being a civil libertarian, I don't think it should be banned, but any critically thinking person has to ask themselves: is this the type of social relationship between the sexes that I can affirm? Is it right to confine women to a mobile cage of cloth?

One good thing to come from my recent re-embrace of traditionalism was a renewed commitment to the Arabic language. I love its beauty and rhythm and richness. I love its poetry. And it is the miftaah (key) to understanding Islam. To getting beyond the gloss of the apologists. To getting to the truth of Islam, whatever is commendable or repugnant from the view of critical consciousness. The concept of shariah has been a hot topic in American culture for the past year. I hope to weigh in on this subject with translations from authentic texts representing the traditional (pre-Modern, pre-Apologetic) views on such topics as Jihad, Apostacy, the status of women and non-Muslims under Islamic law. If there is to be a fruitful discussion of this subject it must be conducted on the basis of the historically normative legal views of classical Islamic scholarship, not on the basis of the misrepresentations of both the Islamophobes and the Islamophyles.