"Theologians have always taught that God's decrees are good, and that this is not a mere tautology: it follows that goodness is logically independent of God's decrees."- Bertrand Russell
If there is no conceivable state of affairs that would force you to admit that, in this case, Allah has acted unjustly or in a manner contrary to the good, then you have denuded the concepts of goodness and justice of meaning. For example, Al Ghazali informs us that "harm is not conceivable from Allah - the High - because He does not encounter any ownership of other than Himself, in which His dealing could be described to be harmful" and "He is able to bring upon His creatures all manner of torture and to try them with all kinds of pain and affliction. Even if He should do this, it would be justice from Him, it would not be vile, it would not be tyrannous."
Justice is intimately bound up with the concept of rights; a common definition of what it is to be just is to observe the rights of others. In a situation where there are no rights at issue, there can be no justice.
As for the good, we humans generally understand good people to be hose who are beneficent to others and avoid harming them. Leaving aside the question of whether Allah is in fact good according to this definition (and the prevalence of 'natural evil' such as earthquakes and tornadoes should make one doubt it), can the claim that 'no matter what Allah does, he is good' be squared with any definition of the good that we would otherwise accept, independent of theology? I doubt that it can. To claim that Allah could torture babies for eternity and still be considered good or to conceive of this as something other than a harm, is to misunderstand what is meant by the word good.
If a word can be applied to describe any conceivable state of affairs, it is meaningless. Given that Muslims apply the words 'good' and 'just' to Allah's actions without consideration of what these actions may be, they apply these terms incorrectly, without regard to their meaning. They thus render them meaningless. Such nihilism in regards to basic ethical terms (one shared by many fundamentalist Christians and others), once it seeps into the deep structure of a mind, prepares it to commit horrors.
Showing posts with label Islam. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Islam. Show all posts
Wednesday, May 22, 2013
Monday, May 20, 2013
Response to Ghilan on Evolution
A couple of months ago, Mohamed Ghilan published a blog post in response to a conference in the UK entitled “Have Muslims Misunderstood Evolution?” I have take issue with his characterizations of atheists, his description of the history of epistemology in Western philosophy, and his depiction of the context and function of evolution in the history of ideas.
We’ll start with his invocation of the trope of the ‘angry atheist.’ This is simply insult, not rational argument. There are, of course, many intellectuals who have taken upon themselves the education of the public about evolutionary theory. They have published many books, given many lectures. The tone of these materials is generally calm and professional. There is sometimes exasperation, but this tends to be caused by the fondness with which Creationists use out of context quotes to attempt to frame a narrative of a ‘theory in crisis.’ One would expect that Ghilan would be the last person to stereotype another group of people as ‘angry.’ As it is, atheists do not hold violent protests outside of the Creation Museum nor do they call for the assassination of those who criticize evolution in the public square. As we all know, the case is quite different when someone violates the ‘sanctity’ of the person of Muhammad.
Towards the beginning of the article, after the slurs, he notes:
“Everyone seems to want to talk about the evidence for or against it. No one is interested in the foundation that it’s built upon, and the subsequent logic and coherence of the theory itself.”
Given that the question is itself (in this particular case) whether it is in fact the case that humans share a common ancestor with all other living species, it is rather obvious that people would want to discuss the evidence for and against the proposition. The problem for Ghilan, as he himself admits is that Muslims:
“proceed to point out whatever holes the theory has and what it doesn’t explain. Well, if history is any guide, those holes will be filled at some point as the theory goes through the normal scientific course of being re-worked, and some clever scientists will come eventually to explain those things that haven’t been explained”
Unable to win a case on the merits (i.e. the evidence), he proceeds to argue the technicalities. He proceeds to give an adequate account of the difference between material and inferred evidence and provides a passable account of the various criteria a theory has to satisfy to be accepted as scientific (although I am a bit put off by his putting the words objective reality in scare quotes).
He assures us that “Material evidence presents no problems for Islam.” Perhaps. But that is primarily because what he calls material evidence (“ the hard data,” “observed phenomena”) does not tell us very much about the world unless it is integrated into an elaborated body of theory.
He begins his discussion of the underlying foundations of evolutionary theory with an overly-simplistic account of the history of epistemology in the Western world. He informs us that
“What the Western intellectual crowd determined for itself was that all that exists is what we can touch, smell, feel, taste, hear, and see.”
This is, of course, completely false. That western intellectual crowd, while holding a great diversity of philosophical views, does generally believe that things such as numbers, logical truths, and the past exist (although we can find exceptions to belief in each of these).
He continues:
“ There’s no such thing as pure reason. To be rational means to make empirically-verifiable statements. “
Again, completely false, as any first year student of philosophy could tell you. He completely ignores the analytic-synthetic distinction. While it is true that deductive arguments do not reveal new truths about the external world, they do organize the truths we do know in new ways and draw out their implications. As A. C. Grayling writes, “There is no logical novelty in the conclusion, though often enough there is psychological novelty” (The God Argument). One cannot be rational if they ignore the results of sound deductive arguments that are relevant to what is being discussed. He also caricatures Descartes skepticism. I think Pierce said it best:
“We cannot begin with complete doubt. We must begun with all the prejudices which we actually have when we enter upon the study of philosophy. These prejudices cannot be dispelled by a maxim, for they are things which it does not occur to us can be questioned. Hence this initial skepticism will be mere self-deception, and not real doubt”
Descartes doubt was a thought-experiment through which he attempted to derive indubitable first principles on which he could build up an edifice of knowledge. Once the foundation was set, empirical evidence could be accepted, analyzed, and employed. The other rationalist philosophers thought similarly- a Platonic skepticism towards sense perception as a source of knowledge as such is not a prominent feature of modern rationalism. Conversely, the empiricists did not deny the utility of ‘pure reason’ as exemplified by mathematics and formal logic in analyzing the data of sense perception. They simply rejected the doctrine that the ultimate foundation of knowledge consists of a series of rationally intuited indubitable truths. Instead, they posited the evidence of the senses as the foundation of knowledge. The dispute did not consist of one side rejecting an entire avenue of knowledge that was accepted by the other- it was a debate over the ultimate foundations of or justification for knowledge.
By contrast, Ghilan tells us that “The Muslim approach was never an either/or in this extremist sense.” There was, of course, no Muslim approach as such. There were a diverse array of thinkers in the Muslim world who dealt with epistemology and they reached conclusions that were just as diverse as those in the west. Al-Ghazali, for example, ultimately drew skeptical conclusions concerning both the use of the senses AND demonstrative reason, and was only released from his doubt “by a light that God almighty cast into my breast, which is the key to the greater part of cognizance" (Deliverer from Error). As for western approaches to overcoming this dichotomy, there have been many from Immanuel Kant’s categories of thought, through the American pragmatists such as Pierce and James, to the modern anti-foundationalist thinkers.
Ghilan then takes a card from the deck of the Christian creationists- he decides that the issue is not one of science but of religious worldviews. He cites Dawkin’s oft-quoted (by fundamentalists) passage about Darwin making “it possible to be an intellectually fulfilled atheist” as evidence that “evolutionary theory is meant for” justifying atheism and that “major function of evolutionary theory... is to provide a pacifier for the reader who might have any inclinations to feeling any reverence towards anything metaphysical.” This is belied by the actual historical facts concerning the genesis (if you pardon the pun) of the theory and by the numerous religious scientists who accept the theory because of its scientific merits, such as its fit with the empirical evidence its explanatory power, fruitfulness in generating research projects, and. Darwin himself tells us in his Autobiography that “ Whilst on board the Beagle I was quite orthodox, and I remember being heartily laughed at by several of the officers (though themselves orthodox) for quoting the Bible as an unanswerable authority on some point of morality.... The old argument of design in nature, as given by Paley, which formerly seemed to me so conclusive, fails, now that the law of natural selection has been discovered” (p. 85-87).
Ultimately, the problem for Ghilan, as it is with creationists such as Phillip E. Johnson, is philosophical naturalism, described by the former as the “assumption that there is nothing beyond this physical realm, and “ that “give[s] a context to the combination of your material and inferred evidence.” Once this is assumed, he admits that “you cannot escape having to accept evolutionary theory as an account for where things came from.” Indeed.
Ghilan’s problem is that philosophical naturalism, in its epistemological form, is a necessary precondition for the scientific endeavor. You cannot frame general laws and theories concerning the physical world which invoke entities that are not subject to the laws of that world and that can flout them at will. Once you allow evil genies (ala Descartes) or gods and goddesses fudge the results by speeding up the decay rates of radioactive elements or tweaking the speed of light, you’ve said goodbye to any confidence you can have in general scientific theories concerning the past.
Besides this concern, it deserves mention that the existence of this physical realm is a shared assumption of common sense, scientific investigation, and the Abrahamic religions. To move beyond it and assert the existence of a supernatural realm and to invoke supernatural explanations of natural phenomena is a step that needs to be argued for. It is not basic in the same way as the assertion that the physical world exists. Ghilan is correct that we cannot evaluate evidence without first principles- but not all first principles are created equal.
He makes the claim that:
“If one were to take all the assertions such as “this evolved from that to solve the problem of moving from water to land”, and restrict the material to just describing structure and function and pointing out the similarities without inducing relatedness, and classify based on similarity rather than “relatedness”, it wouldn’t all of a sudden be any less scientific.”
Besides demonstrating an extreme misunderstanding about evolutionary theory (features do not evolve to solve problems ala Lamarck- new features emerge which incidentally allow organisms to exploit new niches), Ghilan is omitting that science is, at heart, a theorizing activity that moves beyond the given evidence to infer explanations for that evidence which can then be tested in some manner or other. It is not, as Taner Edis put it in describing the peculiar view of science held by Muslim creationists, “a set of practical applications and concrete facts to be collected and organized like stamps.”(An Illussion of Harmony)
He proceeds to create a farcical and condescending dialogue intended to show how close-minded and dogmatic atheists are, quotes a passage from two authors who are not actually denying the fact of evolution but rather the explanatory power of natural selection, and then embarks on a rant about “all the problems seeping from evolutionary theory” (which he does not describe), invoking (of course) Kuhn about all theory being data laden and in which he alludes to the “foundations” of “the science-worshipping militant new atheist crowd” being shook (how?), before ending on an appeal for Muslims to take up the study of traditional theology. Yes, I’m sure that will work.
We’ll start with his invocation of the trope of the ‘angry atheist.’ This is simply insult, not rational argument. There are, of course, many intellectuals who have taken upon themselves the education of the public about evolutionary theory. They have published many books, given many lectures. The tone of these materials is generally calm and professional. There is sometimes exasperation, but this tends to be caused by the fondness with which Creationists use out of context quotes to attempt to frame a narrative of a ‘theory in crisis.’ One would expect that Ghilan would be the last person to stereotype another group of people as ‘angry.’ As it is, atheists do not hold violent protests outside of the Creation Museum nor do they call for the assassination of those who criticize evolution in the public square. As we all know, the case is quite different when someone violates the ‘sanctity’ of the person of Muhammad.
Towards the beginning of the article, after the slurs, he notes:
“Everyone seems to want to talk about the evidence for or against it. No one is interested in the foundation that it’s built upon, and the subsequent logic and coherence of the theory itself.”
Given that the question is itself (in this particular case) whether it is in fact the case that humans share a common ancestor with all other living species, it is rather obvious that people would want to discuss the evidence for and against the proposition. The problem for Ghilan, as he himself admits is that Muslims:
“proceed to point out whatever holes the theory has and what it doesn’t explain. Well, if history is any guide, those holes will be filled at some point as the theory goes through the normal scientific course of being re-worked, and some clever scientists will come eventually to explain those things that haven’t been explained”
Unable to win a case on the merits (i.e. the evidence), he proceeds to argue the technicalities. He proceeds to give an adequate account of the difference between material and inferred evidence and provides a passable account of the various criteria a theory has to satisfy to be accepted as scientific (although I am a bit put off by his putting the words objective reality in scare quotes).
He assures us that “Material evidence presents no problems for Islam.” Perhaps. But that is primarily because what he calls material evidence (“ the hard data,” “observed phenomena”) does not tell us very much about the world unless it is integrated into an elaborated body of theory.
He begins his discussion of the underlying foundations of evolutionary theory with an overly-simplistic account of the history of epistemology in the Western world. He informs us that
“What the Western intellectual crowd determined for itself was that all that exists is what we can touch, smell, feel, taste, hear, and see.”
This is, of course, completely false. That western intellectual crowd, while holding a great diversity of philosophical views, does generally believe that things such as numbers, logical truths, and the past exist (although we can find exceptions to belief in each of these).
He continues:
“ There’s no such thing as pure reason. To be rational means to make empirically-verifiable statements. “
Again, completely false, as any first year student of philosophy could tell you. He completely ignores the analytic-synthetic distinction. While it is true that deductive arguments do not reveal new truths about the external world, they do organize the truths we do know in new ways and draw out their implications. As A. C. Grayling writes, “There is no logical novelty in the conclusion, though often enough there is psychological novelty” (The God Argument). One cannot be rational if they ignore the results of sound deductive arguments that are relevant to what is being discussed. He also caricatures Descartes skepticism. I think Pierce said it best:
“We cannot begin with complete doubt. We must begun with all the prejudices which we actually have when we enter upon the study of philosophy. These prejudices cannot be dispelled by a maxim, for they are things which it does not occur to us can be questioned. Hence this initial skepticism will be mere self-deception, and not real doubt”
Descartes doubt was a thought-experiment through which he attempted to derive indubitable first principles on which he could build up an edifice of knowledge. Once the foundation was set, empirical evidence could be accepted, analyzed, and employed. The other rationalist philosophers thought similarly- a Platonic skepticism towards sense perception as a source of knowledge as such is not a prominent feature of modern rationalism. Conversely, the empiricists did not deny the utility of ‘pure reason’ as exemplified by mathematics and formal logic in analyzing the data of sense perception. They simply rejected the doctrine that the ultimate foundation of knowledge consists of a series of rationally intuited indubitable truths. Instead, they posited the evidence of the senses as the foundation of knowledge. The dispute did not consist of one side rejecting an entire avenue of knowledge that was accepted by the other- it was a debate over the ultimate foundations of or justification for knowledge.
By contrast, Ghilan tells us that “The Muslim approach was never an either/or in this extremist sense.” There was, of course, no Muslim approach as such. There were a diverse array of thinkers in the Muslim world who dealt with epistemology and they reached conclusions that were just as diverse as those in the west. Al-Ghazali, for example, ultimately drew skeptical conclusions concerning both the use of the senses AND demonstrative reason, and was only released from his doubt “by a light that God almighty cast into my breast, which is the key to the greater part of cognizance" (Deliverer from Error). As for western approaches to overcoming this dichotomy, there have been many from Immanuel Kant’s categories of thought, through the American pragmatists such as Pierce and James, to the modern anti-foundationalist thinkers.
Ghilan then takes a card from the deck of the Christian creationists- he decides that the issue is not one of science but of religious worldviews. He cites Dawkin’s oft-quoted (by fundamentalists) passage about Darwin making “it possible to be an intellectually fulfilled atheist” as evidence that “evolutionary theory is meant for” justifying atheism and that “major function of evolutionary theory... is to provide a pacifier for the reader who might have any inclinations to feeling any reverence towards anything metaphysical.” This is belied by the actual historical facts concerning the genesis (if you pardon the pun) of the theory and by the numerous religious scientists who accept the theory because of its scientific merits, such as its fit with the empirical evidence its explanatory power, fruitfulness in generating research projects, and. Darwin himself tells us in his Autobiography that “ Whilst on board the Beagle I was quite orthodox, and I remember being heartily laughed at by several of the officers (though themselves orthodox) for quoting the Bible as an unanswerable authority on some point of morality.... The old argument of design in nature, as given by Paley, which formerly seemed to me so conclusive, fails, now that the law of natural selection has been discovered” (p. 85-87).
Ultimately, the problem for Ghilan, as it is with creationists such as Phillip E. Johnson, is philosophical naturalism, described by the former as the “assumption that there is nothing beyond this physical realm, and “ that “give[s] a context to the combination of your material and inferred evidence.” Once this is assumed, he admits that “you cannot escape having to accept evolutionary theory as an account for where things came from.” Indeed.
Ghilan’s problem is that philosophical naturalism, in its epistemological form, is a necessary precondition for the scientific endeavor. You cannot frame general laws and theories concerning the physical world which invoke entities that are not subject to the laws of that world and that can flout them at will. Once you allow evil genies (ala Descartes) or gods and goddesses fudge the results by speeding up the decay rates of radioactive elements or tweaking the speed of light, you’ve said goodbye to any confidence you can have in general scientific theories concerning the past.
Besides this concern, it deserves mention that the existence of this physical realm is a shared assumption of common sense, scientific investigation, and the Abrahamic religions. To move beyond it and assert the existence of a supernatural realm and to invoke supernatural explanations of natural phenomena is a step that needs to be argued for. It is not basic in the same way as the assertion that the physical world exists. Ghilan is correct that we cannot evaluate evidence without first principles- but not all first principles are created equal.
He makes the claim that:
“If one were to take all the assertions such as “this evolved from that to solve the problem of moving from water to land”, and restrict the material to just describing structure and function and pointing out the similarities without inducing relatedness, and classify based on similarity rather than “relatedness”, it wouldn’t all of a sudden be any less scientific.”
Besides demonstrating an extreme misunderstanding about evolutionary theory (features do not evolve to solve problems ala Lamarck- new features emerge which incidentally allow organisms to exploit new niches), Ghilan is omitting that science is, at heart, a theorizing activity that moves beyond the given evidence to infer explanations for that evidence which can then be tested in some manner or other. It is not, as Taner Edis put it in describing the peculiar view of science held by Muslim creationists, “a set of practical applications and concrete facts to be collected and organized like stamps.”(An Illussion of Harmony)
He proceeds to create a farcical and condescending dialogue intended to show how close-minded and dogmatic atheists are, quotes a passage from two authors who are not actually denying the fact of evolution but rather the explanatory power of natural selection, and then embarks on a rant about “all the problems seeping from evolutionary theory” (which he does not describe), invoking (of course) Kuhn about all theory being data laden and in which he alludes to the “foundations” of “the science-worshipping militant new atheist crowd” being shook (how?), before ending on an appeal for Muslims to take up the study of traditional theology. Yes, I’m sure that will work.
Tuesday, June 14, 2011
The Book of Jihad
Excerpted from Qadi Abu Muhammad Abdul Wahhaab ibn Ali al-Baghdaadi's "At-Talqeen fil fiqhil Maliki" (The Instruction in Malik's Jurisprudence)
Purpose: The purpose of this translation is to present an authentic and reliable source for the Sunni view of Jihad. It is intended as a contribution to the current dialectic which posits that Jihad is either the free-for-all of homicidal terrorism described by the Islamophobes or the purely spiritual, sweetness-and-light struggle posited by the Muslim apologists. It is neither. Jihad is in some ways similar to the "just war" of Catholicism, but broader in scope and open ended. It neither encourages the killing of civilians nor does it prohibit it entirely. It certainly does not conform with modern standards of international law but it is not lawless. It is also quite clear from the classical texts, such as the one presently translated, that it is neither obligatory on each and every Muslim nor something that can be entirely abandoned. Between the extremes of the dialectic we can find the truth.
The author of this blog believes firmly in non-violence, except in strict self-defense. Terrorism, pre-emptive war, slavery, apartheid, and occupation, along with most of the tactics, strategies, and weapons used in modern warfare, are morally repugnant and ought to be rejected, regardless of what any religion says.
Note on the translation: This translation is based on Darul Kutubil 'Ilmiyyah edition published in 1999. The text begins on pg. 68. Being a student, and not a master, of Arabic, I welcome any corrections to my translation, provided permission is given to publish them with credit according to the terms of this blog's Creative Commons license. I have tried to render this translation into idiomatic English because keeping to the formal structure of the book would inhibit clarity. I have summarized rather than translated the section on the conditions for participating in the spoils due to lack of contemporary relevance. Anyone interested in this particular topic can consult Aisha Bewley's translation of the Risalah.
Jihad is a communal obligation* and is incumbent, some of the time, on those who face the enemy. It is not permissible to abandon it entirely in truce except from an excuse. He (the Mujahid**) does not desist from the enemy except that they embrace Islam or enter into our pact (dhimma) and hand over the poll-tax (djizya) in our abode. It is desirable that they are called to Islam before fighting them except that they swiftly descend upon us. It is permissible to harm the enemy via all possible means from among the following: burning of the planted gardens and of fodder, cutting date-palms and trees, wounding animals, and destruction of the country side. Do not touch the bees unless they are numerous. In that case the consensus transmits their destruction.
The spoils are divided in five, all of it, it’s substance and its incidentals, equally, except the gardens, for they are left as pious endowments (awqaaf). Looting and the like are, without distinction, not favoured during fighting except with the permission of the leader (Imam) when he deems that appropriate. The leader takes from the spoils one fifth (al-khums) of it and distributes among the army four fifths of it. It is not permissible to steal from the war booty before it is distributed and the doer of that is punished. His saddlebag is not burned and his portion is not forbidden. The army may eat the food, slaughter the livestock, and take the fodder of the enemy without the permission of the leader. The leader does not reckon it among the spoils.
...
[The author here gives the conditions for participating in the spoils, including that it was gained by fighting or at least by "the exertion of horses" and that it may be distributed to those who are part of the army but did not fight due to sickness and the like. Also, the shares due to cavalrymen and infantry are described. ]
…
Women and youths are not killed nor are very old men, nor hermits nor monks, unless harm or a ruse is feared from them. And their wealth is given back if they are many and what was left for them is only a little.
Protection of the enemy commanders is legally valid. Protection of other than them from the rest of mankind, according to Malik (Allah have mercy on him!), is also valid and their destruction is not permitted. And he also said: “To them [commanders in the Jihad] is the right to permit it or deny it. And when it is permitted it is all the same whether it is a man or a woman, or slave or free adult or adolescent."
In regards to captives, the leader has a choice in the disposition of one fifth. The choices are: killing them, enslaving them, freeing them as a gift or ransoming them, and contracting a covenant. In regards to spies and to the return of hostages, the leader exercises independent reasoning (ijtihad). If they become Muslims, then he who became Muslim is entitled to a settlement and he has the right of possession of his land. And he who became Muslim after his land was forcibly conquered, then it is of the spoils and not returned to them with his Islam. The leader secures it to whoever he deems appropriate. He takes its land tax from he who possesses it. The commandments of booty, the leader's fifth, the land-tax, and poll-tax are one; the leader takes his business from it without assessment and returns the remainder in consolation of the Muslims, and he gives the first quarter from it according to his independent reasoning.
Notes:
*-A Communal Obligation (fard kifayyah) is an act that must be performed by at least one member of the community else the whole community is sinful.
**-Mujahid is the active participle (ismul faa3il) of jaahada, meaning "to endeavor, strive; to fight...; to wage holy war against the infidels" according Hans Wehr. One who engages in Jihad is a mujahid.
Wednesday, June 1, 2011
Islam and Female Genital Mutilation
While not as much in the news lately as it has been in the past, Female Genital Mutilation is still a scourge of women worldwide. Muslim apologists have repeatedly claimed that this practice is strictly cultural and has nothing to do with Islam as a religion. For example, the Muslim Women's League informs us that "According to Sayyid Sabiq, renowned scholar and author of Fiqh-us-Sunnah, all hadiths concerning female circumcision are non-authentic." Shaykh Tantawi and Shaykh Ali Gomaa of Al-Azhar were both against the practice.
But what is the reality? When we examine classical, relied upon texts on Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh), another picture emerges. In Umdat as-Salik, translated as the "Reliance of the Traveler" we find that "Circumcision is obligatory... for both men and women." In the Risalah of Ibn Abi Zayd al-Qayrawani, a core text of the Maliki school of fiqh, it is recorded that circumcision for women is "honourable." Notably, the translation for the commentary on male circumcision was provided while the commentary on female circumcision was omitted. It gives some detail as to what is required and so I have decided to translate it myself. The commentator, Shaykh Saalih Abdus Samee al-Azhari, tells us that "[Circumcision [literally: reduction] in women] And it is cutting the protuberance at the top of the vulva that is like the comb of the rooster. [is honourable] ... with the meaning that it is desirable." Quite colourful.
What of the modern inheritors of the classical tradition? Shaykha Shazia at Sunnipath tells us that "Female circumcision is it itself obligatory in the Shafi`i school, and Shaykh Nuh Keller’s translation in the Reliance of the Traveler is accurate and defines the meaning well. She emphasizes that the clitoris should not be completely cut off and laments " that the correct practice has become an almost-lost art." Abu Haleema at the Hanafi Fiqh Blog informs us that the practice is "sunnah" according to "the view of the Hanafis and Maalikis, and [this] was narrated in one report from Ahmad." This is after giving an over view of the textual evidence in favor of the practice. The Guiding Helper, a modern Maliki fiqh text, defines circumcision as "the removal of the foreskin at the head of the penis or the small cap that covers the clitoris)" (Footnote 2186) and notes that "it is a fadilah (weaker mandub) to remove the small cap over the clitoris in females (of all ages). [Nothing more than this small cap should be cut.] Please note that cutting this small cap usually does not affect the ability of the female to reach orgasm (and by cutting this cap, the female will be able to get mandub credit in the next world for having performing circumcision)" (Footnote 2188).
What is one to make of all this? First, the practice of cutting the sexual organs of women is definitely an Islamic practice. It is not merely cultural and is either obligatory or encouraged in all of the four schools of law. Second, the cutting countenance by the shariah is limited (it is not removal of the whole clitoris) and does not include common practices such as sewing up the vagina. Some critics have maintained that Shaykh Nuh was being dishonest in his translation and that the text literally means to "cut off the clitoris." The Arabic verb qaTa3a means both to cut and to cut off, among other things, but the Shaykh is drawing on the entire tradition of Shafi'i scholarship to which he is heir. The intended audience of the Reliance is the body of English speaking Muslims, not non-Muslims, so I don't think there is a reason to be deceptive because this would constitute misleading fellow Muslims. If his intent was to sugar-coat the issue, he would have simply removed the material entirely or left it untranslated, such as he did with the section of the Umdat that deals with slavery.
But, it must be said, the insistence of modern Shuyookh such as Faraz Rabani, that the practice is no longer recommended (besides being questionable from a fiqhi standpoint) implies that they recognize the abuses that can come out of even this limited permission to cut. The question is, given that the proper procedure has become a "lost art" and horrendous abuse is rampant, why would any scholars recommend it all? Is adherence to medieval formulations of religious law worth all the (female) suffering that results?
But what is the reality? When we examine classical, relied upon texts on Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh), another picture emerges. In Umdat as-Salik, translated as the "Reliance of the Traveler" we find that "Circumcision is obligatory... for both men and women." In the Risalah of Ibn Abi Zayd al-Qayrawani, a core text of the Maliki school of fiqh, it is recorded that circumcision for women is "honourable." Notably, the translation for the commentary on male circumcision was provided while the commentary on female circumcision was omitted. It gives some detail as to what is required and so I have decided to translate it myself. The commentator, Shaykh Saalih Abdus Samee al-Azhari, tells us that "[Circumcision [literally: reduction] in women] And it is cutting the protuberance at the top of the vulva that is like the comb of the rooster. [is honourable] ... with the meaning that it is desirable." Quite colourful.
What of the modern inheritors of the classical tradition? Shaykha Shazia at Sunnipath tells us that "Female circumcision is it itself obligatory in the Shafi`i school, and Shaykh Nuh Keller’s translation in the Reliance of the Traveler is accurate and defines the meaning well. She emphasizes that the clitoris should not be completely cut off and laments " that the correct practice has become an almost-lost art." Abu Haleema at the Hanafi Fiqh Blog informs us that the practice is "sunnah" according to "the view of the Hanafis and Maalikis, and [this] was narrated in one report from Ahmad." This is after giving an over view of the textual evidence in favor of the practice. The Guiding Helper, a modern Maliki fiqh text, defines circumcision as "the removal of the foreskin at the head of the penis or the small cap that covers the clitoris)" (Footnote 2186) and notes that "it is a fadilah (weaker mandub) to remove the small cap over the clitoris in females (of all ages). [Nothing more than this small cap should be cut.] Please note that cutting this small cap usually does not affect the ability of the female to reach orgasm (and by cutting this cap, the female will be able to get mandub credit in the next world for having performing circumcision)" (Footnote 2188).
What is one to make of all this? First, the practice of cutting the sexual organs of women is definitely an Islamic practice. It is not merely cultural and is either obligatory or encouraged in all of the four schools of law. Second, the cutting countenance by the shariah is limited (it is not removal of the whole clitoris) and does not include common practices such as sewing up the vagina. Some critics have maintained that Shaykh Nuh was being dishonest in his translation and that the text literally means to "cut off the clitoris." The Arabic verb qaTa3a means both to cut and to cut off, among other things, but the Shaykh is drawing on the entire tradition of Shafi'i scholarship to which he is heir. The intended audience of the Reliance is the body of English speaking Muslims, not non-Muslims, so I don't think there is a reason to be deceptive because this would constitute misleading fellow Muslims. If his intent was to sugar-coat the issue, he would have simply removed the material entirely or left it untranslated, such as he did with the section of the Umdat that deals with slavery.
But, it must be said, the insistence of modern Shuyookh such as Faraz Rabani, that the practice is no longer recommended (besides being questionable from a fiqhi standpoint) implies that they recognize the abuses that can come out of even this limited permission to cut. The question is, given that the proper procedure has become a "lost art" and horrendous abuse is rampant, why would any scholars recommend it all? Is adherence to medieval formulations of religious law worth all the (female) suffering that results?
Sunday, May 29, 2011
Culture War is not Liberation
I recently intended an informal gathering that featured a long lecture on Islamic politics. One of the points made during this talk really struck me as typical of the problems of Muslim political thought in the current era. The speaker said that Islam was currently the only force capable of resisting the onslaught of Western imperialism and that this was because, to paraphrase, Muslims don't drink liquor and their women don't follow western modes of dress. This, of course, was in a room with many women, at least half of whom were dressed in western clothes.
I talked to the him later and asked him to clarify his remarks. He then gave me a more nuanced, if flawed, explanation of his words: Western Capitalism is constantly seeking out new markets for its products and the social restrictions peculiar to Islam hamper this expansion significantly. The glaring flaw of this statement is that the one country that, more than any other, imposes all of these social restrictions "with extreme prejudice" is also the most integrated into the global capitalist system. I am writing, of course, of Saudi Arabia. While subjecting women to the most restrictive controls of any country on the planet and imposing strict forms of censorship various cultural practices, they not only function as a leading petroleum exporter but as a major investor as well. They've been more than willing to invest massive amounts of money in the American economy to keep it going, fueling the very culture it is intent on resisting.
I take his point that alcohol and other drugs have been used by those in a position of power to keep their charges in state of thralldom. The use of alcohol to subjugate American Indians is well known. The FLN targeted bars and brothels during the Algerian independence struggle because these institutions were used by the French to demoralize and degrade the Algerian people, weakening their capacity to resist. The penetration of American urban ghettos by liquor stores is widely noted as contributing to the downward spiral of the disenfranchised. These attacks on what can be called the political economy of liquor are not sufficient to justify a total cultural prohibition of the practice. Alcohol consumption, for example, has often been used by progressive and leftist groups to build up comradery and group solidarity. The numerous drinking songs of the Wobblies and other left groups are an example of this (the International makes an excellent drinking song!). The absolute prohibition on consumption therefore can not be justified on political grounds alone. In the hands of an absolute monarchy like Saudi Arabia, the prohibition becomes another means to cultivate subservience to royal fiat. Abstaining from drink does not make you a chic revolutionary and indulging in it does not make you a dupe of imperialism.
The political economy of women's dress is a long and complex topic. It is easy to find justification for a number of views simply by observing the endless conga line of fashion trends that surge into prominence and then fade into oblivion. Coach bags? Those are totallyVeblenian objects of conspicuous consumption, meant to inspire an invidious comparison between those who possess them and those who do not. In previous times, a well-accessorized woman was a reflection of worth of the man who kept her, a form of vicarious consumption. Now these items have become direct status-symbols for the woman, reflecting the increasing integration of women into the mainstream of economic life.
The endless round of seasonal variations that characterizes fashion in Pakistan serves many purposes: conspicuous consumption, assertion of identity in the midst of enforced religious anonymity, a creative outlet to compensate for narrowing prospects of professional empowerment. While on the subject of fashion, the speaker stated that it was odd that gay men worked as fashion designers for women. Acting on the theory that gay men are rejectors of women, he cited this as an example of the producers of mass culture having contempt for its consumers. This struck me as odd. It would seem to me that if one wanted a form of dress that did not attempt to objectify women as mere sexual objects, gay men (and heterosexual women, of course) would be just the ones to turn to. But I guess its hard to resist taking pot-shots against the gays.
The reasons which prompt individual women to take up the abaya and niqab are too numerous to mention. When this mode of dress becomes a uniform enforced by the power of the state, such as in Saudi, the effect is to reduce women to the status of what Agamben named Homo Sacer: sacred humans. Their rights are guaranteed in the abstract so that they may be violated in the concrete particulars. They are protected by way of abuse. In the words of the No Doubt song Just a Girl,
"'Cause I'm just a girl, little 'ol me
Don't let me out of your sight
I'm just a girl, all pretty and petite
So don't let me have any rights
'Cause I'm just a girl I'd rather not be
'Cause they won't let me drive
Late at night I'm just a girl,
Guess I'm some kind of freak
'Cause they all sit and stare
With their eyes"
This perfectly encapsulates the paternal voyeurism that plagues gender relations in most Muslim societies. The restrictions are really protections and any woman who in the least way foregos them is fair game for the male gaze and the male hand. I am reminded of Marx's passage in the Communist Manifesto:
"Free trade: for the benefit of the working class. Protective duties: for the benefit of the working class. Prison Reform: for the benefit of the working class... the bourgeois is a bourgeois — for the benefit of the working class."
One could easily rephrase this as:
"Burqas: for the protection of women. Driving restrictions: for the protection of women. Chaperones: for the protection of women. A patriarch is a patriarch, for the protection of women."
What the fight over women's dress in the context of Islam most thoroughly unveils (don't kill me!) is the extent to which women are excluded from this struggle. A political football can't be allowed to dictate its own trajectory. Militant secularists in Tunisia rip the veils from women and then rape them with soda bottles, Islamists (or old-fashioned misogynists) splash acid in the faces of unveiled women, representatives of Saudi state force girls back into their burning school because they don't have their scarfs, veiled women are denied a place in civil society in Turkey, Tunisia, and, increasingly, Western Europe. What is lacking, or, to be precise, actively silenced or ignored, is the voice of Muslim women themselves. The debate over appropriate dress needs to be one internal to the community of Muslim women, without the bearded men or the humanitarian warmongers intervening. Of the Muslim women who have been most active in shaping the debate over hijab, the four most influential have been Fatima Mernissi, Amina Wadud, Maryam Jameelah, Yvonne Ridley, and Asra Nomani. The first three wrote influential books touching on the issue and the last two have been prominent in activism and journalism. Of these four, only the latter has been prominent during the latest phase of the debate: the recent increase in islamophobia in the US and the attempts to criminalize the veil in Western Europe. Whatever side they take on this issue, Muslim women need to play a more prominent role in how it is decided. They should not remain mere objects of debate, but the principal participants.
Both the issue of alcohol and women's dress demonstrate the limits of a culture war as a response to empire. A culture war can easily provide the pretext for a community's incorporation into the global capitalist economy via the ideology of multiculturalism. Multiculturalism is a ploy to support capitalism: it buys off the Muslim leadership, sells out the women, and paves the way for the more thorough capitalization of the Muslim world. We must think dialectically here. It is not a matter of islamophobes getting the government to start concentration camps. The professional islamophobes serve certain very specific goals: invoking the feared Other during a heated election, supporting US foreign policy vis-a-vis Israel. They will come and go as required. It is the ideology of multiculturalism that is the key to the long-term sustainability of capitalism. The dialectic of the closed, mono-cultural, (usually) mono-racial society proposed by the Islamophobes and their secular anti-immigrant allies pitted against the institutional advocates of liberal multi-culturalism will soon give way to a new synthesis: an ‘enlightened’ yet ‘principled’ tolerance that tames the Other, defangs it, and displays it for purposes of ideological reinforcement and entertainment.
This dialectical process will repeated on a larger, global scale vis-a-vis the West and the Islamic world. The ultimate result will be ‘quaint’ survivals useful for justifying the existence of Western civilization as a way of life and, on the more liberal end, to meet the ideological requirement of tolerance of diversity. These survivals will be economically integrated, their resources, both physical and cultural, will be tapped, but they will be self-policing. Identity politics will give way to identity police. Saudi Arabia and Occupied Palestine are both illustrative examples.
In the latter case, the West Bank plays the part of the respectable, secular Arab state. It clamps down on the Islamists, negotiates with Israel, and accepts money from the US in order to more effectively control its own people (an example of the latter being the funding of the Dahlan gangs’ attempted take over of Gaza). The Gaza Strip, under the rule of the Islamist Hamas party, acts as a crucible of Islamist political identity. When the pressure increases, the women feel it. Women, for example, can no longer smoke sheesha (hookah) in public. Lingerie ads are now banned, although perhaps this affects the men more than the women. Women are no longer free to have fabulous male hair-dressers. There is a dialectic at work here: the harder that one side asserts its secular/islamic identity, the greater the identity policing performed by the other side. In Gaza, women are slowly being squeezed back into the home while in the West Bank the space of political participation is being restricted to Fatah apparatchiks. The only solution for the vicious dialectic of multiculturalism is a new global project committed to universal emancipation. Partial solutions and parochial battles are no longer sufficient.
I talked to the him later and asked him to clarify his remarks. He then gave me a more nuanced, if flawed, explanation of his words: Western Capitalism is constantly seeking out new markets for its products and the social restrictions peculiar to Islam hamper this expansion significantly. The glaring flaw of this statement is that the one country that, more than any other, imposes all of these social restrictions "with extreme prejudice" is also the most integrated into the global capitalist system. I am writing, of course, of Saudi Arabia. While subjecting women to the most restrictive controls of any country on the planet and imposing strict forms of censorship various cultural practices, they not only function as a leading petroleum exporter but as a major investor as well. They've been more than willing to invest massive amounts of money in the American economy to keep it going, fueling the very culture it is intent on resisting.
I take his point that alcohol and other drugs have been used by those in a position of power to keep their charges in state of thralldom. The use of alcohol to subjugate American Indians is well known. The FLN targeted bars and brothels during the Algerian independence struggle because these institutions were used by the French to demoralize and degrade the Algerian people, weakening their capacity to resist. The penetration of American urban ghettos by liquor stores is widely noted as contributing to the downward spiral of the disenfranchised. These attacks on what can be called the political economy of liquor are not sufficient to justify a total cultural prohibition of the practice. Alcohol consumption, for example, has often been used by progressive and leftist groups to build up comradery and group solidarity. The numerous drinking songs of the Wobblies and other left groups are an example of this (the International makes an excellent drinking song!). The absolute prohibition on consumption therefore can not be justified on political grounds alone. In the hands of an absolute monarchy like Saudi Arabia, the prohibition becomes another means to cultivate subservience to royal fiat. Abstaining from drink does not make you a chic revolutionary and indulging in it does not make you a dupe of imperialism.
The political economy of women's dress is a long and complex topic. It is easy to find justification for a number of views simply by observing the endless conga line of fashion trends that surge into prominence and then fade into oblivion. Coach bags? Those are totallyVeblenian objects of conspicuous consumption, meant to inspire an invidious comparison between those who possess them and those who do not. In previous times, a well-accessorized woman was a reflection of worth of the man who kept her, a form of vicarious consumption. Now these items have become direct status-symbols for the woman, reflecting the increasing integration of women into the mainstream of economic life.
The endless round of seasonal variations that characterizes fashion in Pakistan serves many purposes: conspicuous consumption, assertion of identity in the midst of enforced religious anonymity, a creative outlet to compensate for narrowing prospects of professional empowerment. While on the subject of fashion, the speaker stated that it was odd that gay men worked as fashion designers for women. Acting on the theory that gay men are rejectors of women, he cited this as an example of the producers of mass culture having contempt for its consumers. This struck me as odd. It would seem to me that if one wanted a form of dress that did not attempt to objectify women as mere sexual objects, gay men (and heterosexual women, of course) would be just the ones to turn to. But I guess its hard to resist taking pot-shots against the gays.
The reasons which prompt individual women to take up the abaya and niqab are too numerous to mention. When this mode of dress becomes a uniform enforced by the power of the state, such as in Saudi, the effect is to reduce women to the status of what Agamben named Homo Sacer: sacred humans. Their rights are guaranteed in the abstract so that they may be violated in the concrete particulars. They are protected by way of abuse. In the words of the No Doubt song Just a Girl,
"'Cause I'm just a girl, little 'ol me
Don't let me out of your sight
I'm just a girl, all pretty and petite
So don't let me have any rights
'Cause I'm just a girl I'd rather not be
'Cause they won't let me drive
Late at night I'm just a girl,
Guess I'm some kind of freak
'Cause they all sit and stare
With their eyes"
This perfectly encapsulates the paternal voyeurism that plagues gender relations in most Muslim societies. The restrictions are really protections and any woman who in the least way foregos them is fair game for the male gaze and the male hand. I am reminded of Marx's passage in the Communist Manifesto:
"Free trade: for the benefit of the working class. Protective duties: for the benefit of the working class. Prison Reform: for the benefit of the working class... the bourgeois is a bourgeois — for the benefit of the working class."
One could easily rephrase this as:
"Burqas: for the protection of women. Driving restrictions: for the protection of women. Chaperones: for the protection of women. A patriarch is a patriarch, for the protection of women."
What the fight over women's dress in the context of Islam most thoroughly unveils (don't kill me!) is the extent to which women are excluded from this struggle. A political football can't be allowed to dictate its own trajectory. Militant secularists in Tunisia rip the veils from women and then rape them with soda bottles, Islamists (or old-fashioned misogynists) splash acid in the faces of unveiled women, representatives of Saudi state force girls back into their burning school because they don't have their scarfs, veiled women are denied a place in civil society in Turkey, Tunisia, and, increasingly, Western Europe. What is lacking, or, to be precise, actively silenced or ignored, is the voice of Muslim women themselves. The debate over appropriate dress needs to be one internal to the community of Muslim women, without the bearded men or the humanitarian warmongers intervening. Of the Muslim women who have been most active in shaping the debate over hijab, the four most influential have been Fatima Mernissi, Amina Wadud, Maryam Jameelah, Yvonne Ridley, and Asra Nomani. The first three wrote influential books touching on the issue and the last two have been prominent in activism and journalism. Of these four, only the latter has been prominent during the latest phase of the debate: the recent increase in islamophobia in the US and the attempts to criminalize the veil in Western Europe. Whatever side they take on this issue, Muslim women need to play a more prominent role in how it is decided. They should not remain mere objects of debate, but the principal participants.
Both the issue of alcohol and women's dress demonstrate the limits of a culture war as a response to empire. A culture war can easily provide the pretext for a community's incorporation into the global capitalist economy via the ideology of multiculturalism. Multiculturalism is a ploy to support capitalism: it buys off the Muslim leadership, sells out the women, and paves the way for the more thorough capitalization of the Muslim world. We must think dialectically here. It is not a matter of islamophobes getting the government to start concentration camps. The professional islamophobes serve certain very specific goals: invoking the feared Other during a heated election, supporting US foreign policy vis-a-vis Israel. They will come and go as required. It is the ideology of multiculturalism that is the key to the long-term sustainability of capitalism. The dialectic of the closed, mono-cultural, (usually) mono-racial society proposed by the Islamophobes and their secular anti-immigrant allies pitted against the institutional advocates of liberal multi-culturalism will soon give way to a new synthesis: an ‘enlightened’ yet ‘principled’ tolerance that tames the Other, defangs it, and displays it for purposes of ideological reinforcement and entertainment.
This dialectical process will repeated on a larger, global scale vis-a-vis the West and the Islamic world. The ultimate result will be ‘quaint’ survivals useful for justifying the existence of Western civilization as a way of life and, on the more liberal end, to meet the ideological requirement of tolerance of diversity. These survivals will be economically integrated, their resources, both physical and cultural, will be tapped, but they will be self-policing. Identity politics will give way to identity police. Saudi Arabia and Occupied Palestine are both illustrative examples.
In the latter case, the West Bank plays the part of the respectable, secular Arab state. It clamps down on the Islamists, negotiates with Israel, and accepts money from the US in order to more effectively control its own people (an example of the latter being the funding of the Dahlan gangs’ attempted take over of Gaza). The Gaza Strip, under the rule of the Islamist Hamas party, acts as a crucible of Islamist political identity. When the pressure increases, the women feel it. Women, for example, can no longer smoke sheesha (hookah) in public. Lingerie ads are now banned, although perhaps this affects the men more than the women. Women are no longer free to have fabulous male hair-dressers. There is a dialectic at work here: the harder that one side asserts its secular/islamic identity, the greater the identity policing performed by the other side. In Gaza, women are slowly being squeezed back into the home while in the West Bank the space of political participation is being restricted to Fatah apparatchiks. The only solution for the vicious dialectic of multiculturalism is a new global project committed to universal emancipation. Partial solutions and parochial battles are no longer sufficient.
More Thoughts on Domestic Violence
One of the acts of a wife which may trigger the chastisement discussed in the earlier post on domestic violence is "nushuz" or disobedience. Nushuz covers many acts, including leaving the home without permission or refusing to have sex with the husband. Because of this, acting in a way that many if not most women living in the west (including Muslim women) take for granted, whether it be freedom of movement, freedom to work outside the home, the right to refuse her husband when she is angry or because she is simply not in the mood, is criminalized in the Shariah. While it is true that a wife may place many stipulations in the marriage contract, most women do not and, to quote Kecia Ali, "this approach misses the forest for the trees" because it "fail[s] to address the basic parameters of the marriage contract itself and the assumptions it is based on." More than this, it fails to take into consideration the universal ethical principles that make life in a diverse, multicultural society possible.
It is this lack of principle that I find to be the most objectionable trait of the Muslim community. All the other evils that I have written about or will write about in this blog, gender injustice, racism, irrational prejudice against Jews and homosexuals, etc., are symptoms of this cardinal failing. Muslims are quite quick to condemn the injustices done to them by invoking universal moral norms or by taking shield behind legal structures that embody these norms, such as the Bill of Rights. On the other hand, when criticism is made of certain Islamic practices, they are just as quick to retreat into the particularities of their own religion, eschewing any universal framework for moral thought.
While the theoretical foundation can be quite different and specific application may vary, the universal ethical principles which have guided moral decision making have at least one trait in common: they admonish us to place care for the other and care for ourselves on equal footing. This is true whether we are talking about the Golden Rule (in it's Jewish, Christian, or Confucian forms), the principle of utility, the Categorical Imperative, veil of ignorance underlying Rawls' Theory of Justice, or Schopenhauer's injunction to "harm no one; on the contrary help everyone as much as you can." These rules force use to take a universal perspective in our decision making, to consider other people as beings with the same inherent worth as we ourselves possess. This universality is independent of their usefulness to us, our emotional attachment to them, or their familial, cultural, or religious bonds to us. Unfortunately, Islam's version of the universal rule, "Love for your brother what you love for yourself" is ambiguous. While many Muslims interpret the term "brother" (akh in arabic) in a universal sense, embracing all of humanity, there are a large number of Islamist ideologues who interpret this term in an exclusive way, referring only to the brotherhood of Muslims. Another ambiguity, to return to the topic of this post, is the manner in which this principle is applied in practice.
Islam is the religion of Submission. Muslims seek the pleasure of Allah and a share in his paradise by way of a life-transaction or, in Arabic, deen. This life-transaction requires sincere submission to a number of religious rites, restrictions, and duties. When notions of gender equality are mentioned to Islamic scholars and other ideologues, the most common apologetic tactic is to invoke the notion of this ultimate goal. Yes, we should love for our sisters in Islam what we love for ourselves. In this case, we should want them to go to paradise just as we desire to go to paradise. The way to paradise according to Islam is clear: in the sphere of gender relations it requires obedience to certain norms regarding dress, speech, association with members of the opposite gender, and compliance with certain laws regarding marriage and family life. Islam is not concerned with equality but equity. A good husband is not the one who indulges his wife's desire but one who ensures that she gets to paradise via adherence to the formal code. Indeed, as any member of the Tableeghi Jamaat will tell you, men will be held accountable for the action of "their women." This creates a further incentive, beyond the strictly ethical, to maintain prescribed norms within the Muslim household. The problem with this approach is that it permits virtually any behavior in the name of the benevolent tutelage of the wife and the sanctity of the home.
To what extremes can this attitude lead? Kecia Ali argues that, based on a study of several Sunni legal texts, "The husband's right to derive pleasure from his wife... led the jurists to grant him total control over her mobility." She quotes a striking example from the Hanafi Law Book, Kitab an-Nafaqat, by Al-Khassaf. What measure can the husband take in response to a refusal of sexual relations? "Is it lawful for the husband to have sex with her against her will...? It is lawful because she is a wrongdoer." This is not an isolated opinion, at least not within the Hanafi school which is dominant in South and Central Asia and parts of the Middle East. Marital rape is a serious issue in every community. It does not need a religious sanction or motivation to occur; it is an expression of the desire for absolute power over another. When this illicit desire is fed the fuel of piety and righteousness, when it is combined with the urge to punish a wrongdoer, it is easy for the marital chamber to become a torture chamber.
It is this lack of principle that I find to be the most objectionable trait of the Muslim community. All the other evils that I have written about or will write about in this blog, gender injustice, racism, irrational prejudice against Jews and homosexuals, etc., are symptoms of this cardinal failing. Muslims are quite quick to condemn the injustices done to them by invoking universal moral norms or by taking shield behind legal structures that embody these norms, such as the Bill of Rights. On the other hand, when criticism is made of certain Islamic practices, they are just as quick to retreat into the particularities of their own religion, eschewing any universal framework for moral thought.
While the theoretical foundation can be quite different and specific application may vary, the universal ethical principles which have guided moral decision making have at least one trait in common: they admonish us to place care for the other and care for ourselves on equal footing. This is true whether we are talking about the Golden Rule (in it's Jewish, Christian, or Confucian forms), the principle of utility, the Categorical Imperative, veil of ignorance underlying Rawls' Theory of Justice, or Schopenhauer's injunction to "harm no one; on the contrary help everyone as much as you can." These rules force use to take a universal perspective in our decision making, to consider other people as beings with the same inherent worth as we ourselves possess. This universality is independent of their usefulness to us, our emotional attachment to them, or their familial, cultural, or religious bonds to us. Unfortunately, Islam's version of the universal rule, "Love for your brother what you love for yourself" is ambiguous. While many Muslims interpret the term "brother" (akh in arabic) in a universal sense, embracing all of humanity, there are a large number of Islamist ideologues who interpret this term in an exclusive way, referring only to the brotherhood of Muslims. Another ambiguity, to return to the topic of this post, is the manner in which this principle is applied in practice.
Islam is the religion of Submission. Muslims seek the pleasure of Allah and a share in his paradise by way of a life-transaction or, in Arabic, deen. This life-transaction requires sincere submission to a number of religious rites, restrictions, and duties. When notions of gender equality are mentioned to Islamic scholars and other ideologues, the most common apologetic tactic is to invoke the notion of this ultimate goal. Yes, we should love for our sisters in Islam what we love for ourselves. In this case, we should want them to go to paradise just as we desire to go to paradise. The way to paradise according to Islam is clear: in the sphere of gender relations it requires obedience to certain norms regarding dress, speech, association with members of the opposite gender, and compliance with certain laws regarding marriage and family life. Islam is not concerned with equality but equity. A good husband is not the one who indulges his wife's desire but one who ensures that she gets to paradise via adherence to the formal code. Indeed, as any member of the Tableeghi Jamaat will tell you, men will be held accountable for the action of "their women." This creates a further incentive, beyond the strictly ethical, to maintain prescribed norms within the Muslim household. The problem with this approach is that it permits virtually any behavior in the name of the benevolent tutelage of the wife and the sanctity of the home.
To what extremes can this attitude lead? Kecia Ali argues that, based on a study of several Sunni legal texts, "The husband's right to derive pleasure from his wife... led the jurists to grant him total control over her mobility." She quotes a striking example from the Hanafi Law Book, Kitab an-Nafaqat, by Al-Khassaf. What measure can the husband take in response to a refusal of sexual relations? "Is it lawful for the husband to have sex with her against her will...? It is lawful because she is a wrongdoer." This is not an isolated opinion, at least not within the Hanafi school which is dominant in South and Central Asia and parts of the Middle East. Marital rape is a serious issue in every community. It does not need a religious sanction or motivation to occur; it is an expression of the desire for absolute power over another. When this illicit desire is fed the fuel of piety and righteousness, when it is combined with the urge to punish a wrongdoer, it is easy for the marital chamber to become a torture chamber.
Islam and Domestic Violence
The reaction of the Muslim community to domestic violence is extremely ambiguous. On the one hand, there are organizations that do good work, especially in providing women’s shelters. On the other hand, we have a community that is in deep denial about the existence of spousal and child abuse within our homes. This results in a continuance of problems that, in any other community, would have been long ago resolved and in a chronic lack of funding for the organizations mentioned above.
This ambiguity has its root in two realities of the Muslim community: troubling textual sources that appear to give permission for domestic violence and the desire to maintain a “good” image for the community. The latter has its origins in the struggle for acceptance and for relevance that the Muslim community has engaged in since the fall of the Islamic world as a major world power. This impulse can be found in virtually any community, religious or non-religious, that has a stake in the battle for public opinion. While disturbing, it is not unique to Muslims.
The textual source is a uniquely Muslim problem. In the 4th verse of Surat an-Nisaa’ (Womankind) Muslim men are given the command “iḍribūhunna” in the context of dealing with a disobedient wife. This literally means “hit them” or “strike them.” The verb Daraba (he hit) is a favorite among Arabic Grammarians and is used often in giving examples of new grammatical forms. Zaidun Daraba Huseinan (Zaid hit Husein), unfortunately, can quickly become Zaidun Daraba Hindan.
Recently, I had a conversation with a friend who is a native Arabic speaker on this subject. Her objection was not just to the command itself, but to the ambiguity of the command. As Muslims apologists are quick to point out, the verb Daraba has more than one meaning, even in the Qur’an. In the name of apologetics or even reform one could use these alternate meanings to defang the command. But, as my friend pointed out, the very ambiguity is what does the most damage: it allows some to live with themselves and continue to maintain a religious system which gives permission to others to engage in domestic violence. She argued that this ambiguity makes it hard to believe that the Qur’an (or parts of it, at least) is a true scripture sent down by an Omniscient being. Such a being would know precisely how these ambiguities would be used for evil and would therefore avoid them.
There is a further problem with this command, however. Let’s assume the apologists are correct and this is not a reference to physical violence. Let’s go beyond them and assume it really is unambiguous and any interpretation which gives permission for physical violence is in bad faith and unauthentic. We are then forced to confront the problem of existential choice. This command and obedience to it affirms a system of values in which men have authority over women and have the right to admonish, instruct, and discipline them. It is a system of values in which women are reduced to permanent childhood and tutelage vis-a-vis men. This system of values finds its concrete expression in the legal systems of various Muslim countries. Even more “liberal” nations are deeply steeped in a patronising patriarchy, an phenomena illustrated in this report out of the United Arab Emirates.
I find this much more disturbing and destructive to faith than any empirical test of religion (i.e. Did Ancient Egyptians crucify people, was there a flood that killed Nuh’s people, etc.). When I was in college, I had a professor who was astonished and disappointed by my conversion. He brought up this verse and I was ready with my copy of Muhamad Asad commentary explaining all of the problems away. A tooth brush (miswak) was all that was meant and it was purely ceremonial! My professor told me (paraphrasing), “What right does a man have to subject a woman to such an undignified ceremony?” I had no answer for that and I still do not. No one has the right to strip away the dignity of another person, in the name of religion, the family, or pure egotism. As a thinking being endowed with a body, I affirm a set of values when I think and I act. That is the higher level of my responsibility, beyond the thoughts and actions themselves. Is it possible to affirm a set of values that avoids the injustices that are rampant in the Muslim community and yet still authentically Islamic? I now have serious doubts.
This ambiguity has its root in two realities of the Muslim community: troubling textual sources that appear to give permission for domestic violence and the desire to maintain a “good” image for the community. The latter has its origins in the struggle for acceptance and for relevance that the Muslim community has engaged in since the fall of the Islamic world as a major world power. This impulse can be found in virtually any community, religious or non-religious, that has a stake in the battle for public opinion. While disturbing, it is not unique to Muslims.
The textual source is a uniquely Muslim problem. In the 4th verse of Surat an-Nisaa’ (Womankind) Muslim men are given the command “iḍribūhunna” in the context of dealing with a disobedient wife. This literally means “hit them” or “strike them.” The verb Daraba (he hit) is a favorite among Arabic Grammarians and is used often in giving examples of new grammatical forms. Zaidun Daraba Huseinan (Zaid hit Husein), unfortunately, can quickly become Zaidun Daraba Hindan.
Recently, I had a conversation with a friend who is a native Arabic speaker on this subject. Her objection was not just to the command itself, but to the ambiguity of the command. As Muslims apologists are quick to point out, the verb Daraba has more than one meaning, even in the Qur’an. In the name of apologetics or even reform one could use these alternate meanings to defang the command. But, as my friend pointed out, the very ambiguity is what does the most damage: it allows some to live with themselves and continue to maintain a religious system which gives permission to others to engage in domestic violence. She argued that this ambiguity makes it hard to believe that the Qur’an (or parts of it, at least) is a true scripture sent down by an Omniscient being. Such a being would know precisely how these ambiguities would be used for evil and would therefore avoid them.
There is a further problem with this command, however. Let’s assume the apologists are correct and this is not a reference to physical violence. Let’s go beyond them and assume it really is unambiguous and any interpretation which gives permission for physical violence is in bad faith and unauthentic. We are then forced to confront the problem of existential choice. This command and obedience to it affirms a system of values in which men have authority over women and have the right to admonish, instruct, and discipline them. It is a system of values in which women are reduced to permanent childhood and tutelage vis-a-vis men. This system of values finds its concrete expression in the legal systems of various Muslim countries. Even more “liberal” nations are deeply steeped in a patronising patriarchy, an phenomena illustrated in this report out of the United Arab Emirates.
I find this much more disturbing and destructive to faith than any empirical test of religion (i.e. Did Ancient Egyptians crucify people, was there a flood that killed Nuh’s people, etc.). When I was in college, I had a professor who was astonished and disappointed by my conversion. He brought up this verse and I was ready with my copy of Muhamad Asad commentary explaining all of the problems away. A tooth brush (miswak) was all that was meant and it was purely ceremonial! My professor told me (paraphrasing), “What right does a man have to subject a woman to such an undignified ceremony?” I had no answer for that and I still do not. No one has the right to strip away the dignity of another person, in the name of religion, the family, or pure egotism. As a thinking being endowed with a body, I affirm a set of values when I think and I act. That is the higher level of my responsibility, beyond the thoughts and actions themselves. Is it possible to affirm a set of values that avoids the injustices that are rampant in the Muslim community and yet still authentically Islamic? I now have serious doubts.
Islam and Race Relations
Towards the end of my first marriage, my soon-to-be ex told me that she should have married another Pakistani because he would understand her better. We never had disagreements directly about race, so I assume this is a judgement about the overall trend of my behavior. Because I was consciously adopting a Pakistani identity I no doubt engaged in too much essenctializing, reducing the complex phenomena of Pakistani culture to easily adopted symbols. The increased intensity of my commitment to Islam which followed upon my trip to Lahore and Islamabad also contributed to the deterioration of our relationship, for related reasons. I fastened on to the Islamic identity of Pakistan while that aspect of Pakistan was what she disliked the most. She favored the elements of continuity with the shared culture of India, even learning Bharatnatyam.
I've had to struggle with this issue since I first converted to Islam. I always felt bad when my brothers (or my then wife) would call me "the white guy?" Didn't they get the message that I wasn't white anymore? Didn't they see my long scraggly beard, my kufi, my shalwar-kameez? Didn't they see the kafiyyah I wore in solidarity with my Occupied brothers and sisters in Palestine? I got called the same names they did, "rag-head," "sand-nigger," and what not. Why couldn't they get with the program? Now, of course, I see how pretentious and narcissistic this was. I think the comments that I received that I was more Pakistani than Pakistani people may have been a good-natured attempt to get me see the reality of my position. In the end, I could shave my beard and switch back to jeans and a t-shirt. They were stuck with their skin-colour, facial features, and names. It's not good to humour someone with an obsessive "Dances with Wolves" complex.
While not a major problem in my current marriage, there have been some flare ups. There has never been an argument over specific things that I have said, but my comments here and there left her with a nagging feeling that I look at her in a paternalistic way. The problem for me is two fold: I have to look at myself, my actions, my words and determine what truth there is in her statement and I have to express my reply in a way that will not strengthen the very suspicions that it is meant to alleviate.
Zizek mentioned the need to get beyond the paternalistic multicultural bullshit that keeps us from connecting as individuals (the my culture is great, your culture is great syndrome). But it is sometimes that connection that leads to a more intense racial feeling; when we feel connected, we express ourselves more freely. When we express ourselves more freely, we are more likely to say something that will be misconstrued or that becomes demeaning due to the social position of the person making the statement. Should I then retreat into the multicultural bubble, expressing my admiration for her culture or, to be more precise, for the strength of Indian women? Is that not patronizing as well? Zizek's answer to this conundrum was to form a new solidarity based on struggle. It may not be a panacea, but I think it will be an effective response not just to the problem of inter-cultural or inter-racial marriages, but to solidarity within the Muslim and American communities. We can unite together in the struggle to build a strong family, to deal with the serious issues facing the Muslim community,to confront the flagrant injustice that constitutes the social fabric in America.
I've had to struggle with this issue since I first converted to Islam. I always felt bad when my brothers (or my then wife) would call me "the white guy?" Didn't they get the message that I wasn't white anymore? Didn't they see my long scraggly beard, my kufi, my shalwar-kameez? Didn't they see the kafiyyah I wore in solidarity with my Occupied brothers and sisters in Palestine? I got called the same names they did, "rag-head," "sand-nigger," and what not. Why couldn't they get with the program? Now, of course, I see how pretentious and narcissistic this was. I think the comments that I received that I was more Pakistani than Pakistani people may have been a good-natured attempt to get me see the reality of my position. In the end, I could shave my beard and switch back to jeans and a t-shirt. They were stuck with their skin-colour, facial features, and names. It's not good to humour someone with an obsessive "Dances with Wolves" complex.
While not a major problem in my current marriage, there have been some flare ups. There has never been an argument over specific things that I have said, but my comments here and there left her with a nagging feeling that I look at her in a paternalistic way. The problem for me is two fold: I have to look at myself, my actions, my words and determine what truth there is in her statement and I have to express my reply in a way that will not strengthen the very suspicions that it is meant to alleviate.
Zizek mentioned the need to get beyond the paternalistic multicultural bullshit that keeps us from connecting as individuals (the my culture is great, your culture is great syndrome). But it is sometimes that connection that leads to a more intense racial feeling; when we feel connected, we express ourselves more freely. When we express ourselves more freely, we are more likely to say something that will be misconstrued or that becomes demeaning due to the social position of the person making the statement. Should I then retreat into the multicultural bubble, expressing my admiration for her culture or, to be more precise, for the strength of Indian women? Is that not patronizing as well? Zizek's answer to this conundrum was to form a new solidarity based on struggle. It may not be a panacea, but I think it will be an effective response not just to the problem of inter-cultural or inter-racial marriages, but to solidarity within the Muslim and American communities. We can unite together in the struggle to build a strong family, to deal with the serious issues facing the Muslim community,to confront the flagrant injustice that constitutes the social fabric in America.
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