Taking Sides: Why Gaza?

Introduction

The latest stage in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is being played out on newsfeeds and timelines as we speak. Free from the curatorial process of professional news editors, who decide which views and perspectives get aired to a captive audience, subaltern perspectives are now able to reach a wide audience.

The loss of life and devastation of infrastructure experienced by the people of Gaza is both too visceral and too widespread to be denied. In response, a new apologetic tactic has emerged: an affected neutrality that recognizes, to some extent, the human rights violations committed by the Israeli government but attempts to minimize them by dehumanizing the Palestinians and promoting easily debunked myths about them, by depicting the conflict as inevitable and intractable, and attempts to deter activism by concerned citizens by either a ‘pox on both your houses’ stance or by engaging in concern trolling by bringing up other international conflicts that have higher death tolls or less morally ambiguous combatants. There are three compelling arguments that can be made against this studied indifference and for activism by Americans on behalf of the people of Gaza.

The American Role

The first is that, unlike many other human rights disasters, the US plays a direct role in the form of military aid and political support that it gives to Israel. The same is not the case for ISIS, the Taliban, the Assad regime and its opponents (with some exceptions). As US citizens, we have a chance to influence policy and create a better, more just outcome, even if it is a small one. We also have an obligation to use that influence in an attempt to prevent injustices committed in our name or on our dime.

The Nature of Israel

The second argument is that Israel is a liberal democracy that can be swayed by public opinion and is very conscious of its image both abroad and internally. ISIS and the Assad regime couldn't care less and Saudi only cares to a small extent. Similarly, we hold liberal democracies to a higher standard than rag-tag terrorists groups, brutal dictatorships, or absolute monarchies because they represent the will of a sovereign people and ostensibly stand on a moral foundation of consent, consultation, and justice.

Part of that standard is proportionality in military response. This does not mean that casualties on either side have to be equal or nearly so, but that it is illegal when “an attack is launched on a military objective in the knowledge that the incidental civilian injuries would be clearly excessive in relation to the anticipated military advantage” (Moreno-Ocampo).This is clearly the case in regard to the current operation in Gaza where the military goals include stopping rocket fire that has resulted in less than three dozen casualties over the course of a decade and collapsing tunnels alleged to be used to smuggle parts for the rockets (but are also known to be used to smuggle food and medical supplies as well). The military response has killed over 40 times more civilians than the offense that ostensibly provoked it. That is the definition of disproportionality.

It might be objected that Israel is showing great restraint and that they don’t intentionally kill civilians- why would they when it hurts their image? Israel IS sensitive to how it is perceived abroad but it is even more sensitive to internal Israeli opinion and nothing makes that go sour like military casualties. As Norman Finkelstein has pointed out during a recent speech, “Israel’s first rule is to minimize combatant casualties.” One way of achieving this goal is by indiscriminate bombing that leaves little standing in its wake. He also mentions other motivations such as revenge for IDF casualties and a strategic goal of using widespread bombing to cow the Palestinians into submission. The argument that Israel is showing 'great restraint' has been ably debunked by P.Z. Myers. Needless to say, the good intentions of the IDF will not bring back the civilians they have killed.

It may be said that holding the Israeli government to a higher standard than the Arabs is an example of the 'racism of lower expectations.' I have to disagree with this. Israel is a state with a liberal democratic form of government. The Arabs are an ethnic group with a vast degree of differences among them in terms of forms of government, language, and cultural features. It's an apples to oranges comparison. My argument is not that Arabs are not/should not be held to a higher standard, it's that liberal democratic states are and should be held to a higher standard than non-state terrorist groups, authoritarian dictatorships, and absolute monarchies. A state, and especially a liberal democratic state, enjoys the monopoly of the legitimate use of force in a given territory. In order for that monopoly to remain legitimate, it must observe certain moral standards and maintain the rule of law. Not observing them actually degrades the rule of law, the enforcement of which is one of the main justifications for the state's existence.

Tolerance and even receptiveness to criticism is the strength of an open society. Nobody does Israel (or the United States, for that matter) any favors by attempting to shield it from criticism. It is a virtue that Israel does care about the opinions of its citizens and, to a lesser extent, it's image in the rest of the world (especially the West). Assad couldn't care less. Putin couldn't care less. This means that we have some small means of influencing Israel's actions towards a less destructive path that we do not have in relation to conflicts elsewhere in the world.

The Siege

The third argument is that the siege of Gaza, which constitutes an ongoing act of war that has cause far more death and suffering than the rockets fired by Hamas, makes it impossible for the civilian population to flee. This makes the situation different, and far more dire, than is the case in Syria, Pakistan, Iraq, Nigeria, and other countries. There is no safe, neutral ground to which refugees can flee and receive aid to ease their suffering. This makes a direct political/social intervention in the conflict more pressing because it is the only alternative available if a truly staggering amount of death and suffering is to be avoided. For example, according to a UN report, by 2020 Gaza will be incapable of supporting its population. This is a direct result of Israeli policy aimed not at an organization but at an entire people.

There are some who maintain that the occupation of Gaza ended in 2006 with the withdrawal of Israeli troops and the dismantling of the settlements there. This is erroneous. An ongoing siege that confines a population to a small territory cut off from the rest of the world and that is repeatedly punctuated by bombardment and invasion is indistinguishable from an occupation, a view with strong support in both International and Israeli law.

Conclusion

The claim that the conflict is insoluble because of the tribalism on each side and the purported religious roots of the conflict obfuscates the actual material goals of each side, goals that can at least be partially met via compromise. The settlements, the confiscation of land, the network of checkpoints that impede free movement by Palestinians, control of the borders between the territories and their Arab neighbors, seizure of valuable natural resources, most especially water, all have a clear, material goal: increasing the level of control that Israel has over the Palestinian people and increasing Israel's own strategic depth vis-à-vis its neighbors. Hamas also has outlined clear material goals (based on international law) the satisfaction of which would lead to a long term truce. A treaty that met the material goals of the Palestinian people while at the same time giving Israel security from its neighbors would make the settlements and checkpoints unnecessary and would allow the Palestinians to rebuild their lives, undermining calls for further violence on both sides. The Palestinians have a clear record of supporting a resolution to the conflict on the basis of international law. It is Israel that remains recalcitrant in regards to its obligations and we have a duty, as Americans whose government has given so much support to Israel, to hold it accountable.

It has been pointed out that a great deal of the outrage over the conflict in the Middle East is selective and that the focus on Israel is due not to a concern for human rights but to a hatred of Jews. Even if true, this is beside the point. Haters gonna hate. People quite often do the right thing for the wrong reason. The question is what motivates you to take notice and take sides. And have no doubt; not taking sides when a civilian population is facing siege and bombardment IS taking sides- against them.

A Review of Lucretius' De Rerum Natura (The Way Things Are)

This book represents the classic statement, in poetic form, of the natural and ethical philosophy of Epicurus. The natural philosophy is materialist and atomic. It is surprisingly prescient, as will be seen later. This materialist philosophy of nature, which argues that the soul/mind/spirit is a material substance dispersed at death and that the universe shows no evidence of divine planning or providence lays the foundation on ethical philosophy which advocates the pursuit of the simple and tranquil life. Pleasures are to be pursued within the limits of prudence, above all the pleasures of friendship and learning. Political ambition and avarice are to be shunned as disrupting tranquility and engendering pain, unreflective hedonism is to be avoided as leading to a surplus of harm over pleasure, and the observance of the natural justice of reciprocity and honesty is argued to be the key to security. Above all, Lucretius wants to free us from the baseless fears of religion, which spoil our lives with a spectre of post-mortem torment and waste it on needless and even harmful ritual. For him, the surest way to achieve this goal is to understand ‘the way things are’ (one possible translation of the title) and realize that death is nothing to be feared and that there is no divine wrath to be engendered by breaking taboos.

Source: http://www.cdla.co.uk/?page_id=1859

Lucretius explanation is expansive, touching on physics, chemistry, cosmology, astronomy, geology, biology, anthropology, psychology, and sociology. As is to be expected, he gets a fair amount wrong but what is surprising is the number of things he gets right. He was able to discern a number of principles and facts that were later confirmed thousands of years later using only his own reason and observation, informed by the teachings he had inherited from previous philosophers. I will here expand on an argument formulated by Saif Rahman in his book “The Islamist Delusion.” It is frequently claimed that a certain religious scripture is miraculous because it contains scientific knowledge that was unknown to the people of the time and only recently confirmed by modern science. Common examples of this argument include the description of embryology in the Qur’an, the order of creation in the Book of Genesis, and the anticipation of the quantum mechanics in the Tao Te Ching. Any scientific absurdities in these texts are either ignored or explained away. Lucretius work is a strong argument against the tenability of these arguments. The list of scientific advances he anticipated rivals that adduced to any of the scriptures considered sacred by the world’s religions and his mistakes can, like those in the Bible and the Qur’an, be ignored or re-interpreted. Given that this is the case and that we know that Lucretius was not the recipient of supernatural revelations, these supposed scientific miracles are not in need of a non-naturalistic explanation. The naturalistic explanation of human insight and observation combined with luck is sufficient to explain these supposed miracles, just as they explain Lucretius numerous successes. Lucretius poem also refutes another old saw used to explain the lack of scientific rigor in the sacred texts: they were addressed to the people who lived at the time of their composition/revelation who would not have have been able to integrate advanced scientific knowledge into their worldview. Yet we find Lucretius discoursing at length and eloquently on particle physics, an infinite universe teeming with worlds and alien life, and causes of lunar phases. If a man could do it, why couldn’t an infinitely wise God?

The following is a list of the scientific discoveries and modern philosophical notions that Lucretius anticipated, referenced by the page number of the Penguin Classics edition of 1951 (R.E. Latham, translator) (NB: inclusion on this list does not imply a claim that Lucretius originated the idea, merely that he reported it):

Atomic theory- Page 28
The first law of thermodynamics- Page 31, Page 33
Ecological circulation of matter- Page 34
The circle of life- Page 35
Our sense of smell is caused by sensing particles- Page 36
‘Solid objects’ are actually full of space- Page 37
Newton’s first law- Page 62
Experimental inference- Page 63
Lack of teleology in nature- Page 65, Page 156, Page 177
Quantum indeterminacy- Page 66
Galileo’s law of falling bodies- Page 67
Lightning is a finer substance than fire- Page 71
Particle theory of light- Page 71
The properties of a smell depends on the properties of the particles that cause them- Page 72
Water filtration- Page 74
Visible bodies are composed of atoms of various types- Page 80
Atoms are colourless- Page 81
The properties of bodies are due to the types of particles of which they are composed and their arrangement- Page 82
Colour is a result of the eye being stimulated in a certain way by light- Page 84
“We are all composed of heavenly seed”- Page 89
Infinite worlds and extraterrestrial life; Carl Sagan’s ‘what a waste of space!’ argument- Page 91
Metaphysical naturalism- Page 92
Arguments justifying SETI/precursors of the Drake equation- Page 92
The problem of evil- Page 92,93
The role of circulatory system in distributing nutrients- Page 93
The Earth has finite resources- Page 94
The mind and body are one material unity- Page 101
Physiology determines personality traits and temperaments- Page 105
The eyes see, not the mind- Page 107
There are thresholds of sensation below which we sense nothing- Page 107
Reincarnation is bunk- Page 116
Theory of the eternal recurrence- Page 122
Dreams can be explained naturalistically- Page 131, Page 155, Page 160
The underlying objects of sense are the same objects experienced by different modalities- Page 137
Darkness is the absence of light- Page 141
Absolute skepticism is self-refuting- Page 145
Argument for Empiricism- Page 145
Naturalistic explanation of echoes- Page 148
Nutritional value is independent of taste- Page 150
Physiology determines diet- Page 150
Physical underpinnings of smell- Page 151
Parts of the brain associated with sight are stimulated when ‘seeing’ things in a dream- Page 153
The psychology of expectation in explaining dreams- Page 155
The organs of the body predate their current uses- the tongue predates its current use by humans in speech- Page 156
The psychology of habituation in explaining dreams- Page 160
Naturalistic/Physiological explanation of sexuality, infatuation, and lust- Page 161
Women enjoy sex- Page167
Genetic basis of heredity- Page 168
Offspring are the result of the mingling of both male and female seeds- Page 169
Naturalistic explanation of sterility/infertility- Page 169
Fertility is influenced by diet- Page 170
Mind is a natural phenomenon- Page 172
The Earth and the heavenly bodies are neither eternal nor divine- Page 174
The reality of entropy- Page 180
Nebular hypothesis of the origin of the Earth and heavenly bodies- Page 184
The sun and moon are both globes- Page 185
The moon reflects the Sun’s light- Page 188, Page 192
The moon is closer to the Earth than the Sun- Page 190
Correct explanation of Lunar phases- Page 192
The Earth’s shadow can cause eclipses of the moon- Page 194
An inkling of natural selection- wasteful diversity filtered by trial in nature- Page 197
The social contract- Page 202
An inkling of Chomsky’s universal grammar- Page 203
Naturalistic account of the origins of religion- Page 207
The cause of thunder- Page 220
The origin of lighting- Page 222
Natural disasters are natural phenomena, not divine judgments- Page 229
The water cycle- Page 231, Page 236
Partial explanation of earthquakes- Page 234
Explanation of avernian lakes- Page 240
Epidemics can be explained naturalistically- Page 250
Environmental causes of human variation- Page 251

Why I am Against the Drone War

For the current policy of drone war against suspected terrorists around the world to be morally justified it must, as a necessary condition, pass muster before the bar of at least one of the commonly accepted moral theories: consequentialism, deontology, and virtue theory.

From a consequentialist (i.e. 'ends justify the means') perspective, the drone war is justified if and only if it will result in the deaths of less people than would die if it were not pursued.  This saving of lives would occur via a combination of having prevented terror attacks that would resulted in mass casualties, saving infrastructure that is vital to the well being of people, and allowing a higher level of education in the targeted countries (this consideration would primarily apply to Pakistan and Afghanistan).  The administration and its supporters have not presented a convincing case for this net saving of lives.  There is, in fact, good reason to be skeptical that the drone war is even having a significant effect in reducing terrorism, let alone creating a net surplus of saved lives, as described in this article.  

Someone may object that the drone war costs less lives than either a full or partial invasion.  But this is a false dichotomy.  There are other options besides the drone war, including complete disengagement (i.e. dealing with terror related issues as law enforcement problems within the targeted countries) and special forces operations of the type that killed Bin Laden (which resulted in far fewer civilian casualties than a drone strike).  Both these options would likely result in less civilian casualties than are being created in the drone war.

Someone may object that the Pakistan army cannot handle the problem of terrorism by itself.  First, it is questionable whether it cannot handle terrorism or it simply will not, given the ties between Pakistani military intelligence and various extremist groups.  Second, the US cannot sustain the beat of being the policeman of the world.  It does not have the material resources nor does it have the necessary sophistication to carry out this function while avoiding large civilian casualty tolls.  Besides this, the primary goal of the drone campaign is not secure civil society in Pakistan.  The goal is to secure the US and its citizens at home and abroad.  If the moral calculus is thus narrowed, it is extremely difficult to make the case that the drone war is saving more lives than it is taking.  Pakistan, if it is to survive, needs to take care of its own security needs.  The negative social and political consequences of US military intervention are already being felt and will only worsen as the drone war continues. As long as America is giving aid to that army it should, of course, insist that certain goals are met (i.e. actually protecting its civilian population), but these goals must be met in a manner consistent with international human rights agreements that both countries recognize. Apart from that, aid aimed at revitalizing the Pakistani economy and providing for a more prosperous and educated citizenry is the best that America can do to help Pakistan in the long term.

From a deontological, or duty/rights-based, perspective, there is little that can be said in defense of the drone war.  It certainly cannot be made a universal maxim that all males of a certain age in a kill zone be treated as targets. The civilians who are killed in the course of the drone war are not being treated as ends in themselves but as mere things ('collateral damage').  The drone war has even adopted the 'double-tap' tactic long associated with terrorists in order to target aid workers and thus discourage the natural human instinct to help victims of a disaster.  The targets themselves are also denied the procedural rights that they are guaranteed by universal human rights conventions and, in some cases, by the US constitution.  This is a situation that cannot be justified by invoking the categorical imperative, the golden rule, Felix Adler's ethical maxim ("always act so as to elicit the best in others and thereby yourself"), or other accounts of ethics in terms of duty.

What can virtue theory tell us about the drone war?  In Aristotle's account, a virtue is the mid-point on a continuum of behavior the ends of which are vices.  If you donate too much to charity (i.e. to the point that it harms you and those dependent on you) you have manifested the vice of prodigality.  If you give to little, you are miserly.  If you consistently give the maximal amount that you can sustain without harming yourself or those dependent on you, you have attained the virtue of liberality.  

This scheme can be applied to the policy response to the problem of terrorism.  There is a continuum of such responses, the poles of which represent inaction to the point of criminal neglect and total destruction of the civilian areas in which terrorists pursue their campaigns.  It goes without saying that both of these poles are vicious.  The virtuous mean on this spectrum is identical to that policy that will achieve the goal effectively hampering terrorism while minimizing to the utmost civilian casualties.  The question to be asked is: Does the drone war meet this criteria?  With at least two other viable options (criminal investigation and special operations) available, both of which are likely to result in less civilian deaths than drone strikes, it is very difficult to answer that question in the affirmative.

To sum up: if the drone war is to be justified, it must be acceptable according to at least one of the generally accepted ethical theories.  A justification on deontological grounds is unlikely if not impossible, a justification on consequentialist grounds hinges on evidence that is, at the current time, doubtful at best, and a justification on the grounds of virtue theory could only be obtained after experience shows that less violent strategies have failed.  I therefore cannot support the drone war and must reject it as immoral.

A Review of A.C. Grayling's 'The God Argument'

I loved this book.  Grayling opens with a critique of religion that focuses first on the most likely historical and psychological roots of religious belief and then on the most common arguments for the existence of God.  The latter are dismantled with the precision one would expect from a philosopher.  I was particularly pleased by his discussion of Plantinga's modal version of the ontological argument.

He also deals with issue of framing the discussion between atheists and believers, noting that the use of the word God (as opposed to 'gods and goddesses' or 'Fred') as a proper noun conveys a sense of gravitas to theological discourse to which it is not entitled.  It also obscures what is really going on in the standard pro-theistic arguments by creating the illusion that they are about something more substantive than a something-we-know-not-what.

The second part of the book moves beyond the negation of religion and argues for the adoption of Humanism as a life stance.  Humanism affirms the centrality of human experience in understanding ethical values and posits the flourishing of human beings as the goal of ethical action.  After elucidating what he means by humanism, Grayling proceeds to describe the elements that make up a good life.  He then moves on to more specific issues, such as human sexuality, abortion, drug use, and euthanasia.  He closes with a contrast between the religious and humanistic views of the world and concludes that all that is good in the former is present in the latter, while the negative qualities of the former are avoided.

This is a welcome addition to literature on atheism and to the current ongoing debate on the place of religion in public life.  Atheism as such is negative- it is nothing more or less than a lack of belief in gods and goddesses.  Much of the atheistic literature focuses on the absurdities and harmful effects of religion.  This is good and necessary, as far as it goes, but it brings me pleasure to see authors moving on to discuss the next step beyond the rejection of religion- the affirmation of the life of this world.

Allah, Goodness and Justice

"Theologians have always taught that God's decrees are good, and that this is not a mere tautology: it follows that goodness is logically independent of God's decrees."- Bertrand Russell


If there is no conceivable state of affairs that would force you to admit that, in this case, Allah has acted unjustly or in a manner contrary to the good, then you have denuded the concepts of goodness and justice of meaning.  For example, Al Ghazali informs us that "harm is not conceivable from Allah - the High - because He does not encounter any ownership of other than Himself, in which His dealing could be described to be harmful" and "He is able to bring upon His creatures all manner of torture and to try them with all kinds of pain and affliction. Even if He should do this, it would be justice from Him, it would not be vile, it would not be tyrannous." 

Justice is intimately bound up with the concept of rights; a common definition of what it is to be just is to observe the rights of others.  In  a situation where there are no rights at issue, there can be no justice.

As for the good, we humans generally understand good people to be hose who are beneficent to others and avoid harming them.  Leaving aside the question of whether Allah is in fact good according to this definition (and the prevalence of 'natural evil' such as earthquakes and tornadoes should make one doubt it), can the claim that 'no matter what Allah does, he is good' be squared with any definition of the good that we would otherwise accept, independent of theology?  I doubt that it can.  To claim that Allah could torture babies for eternity and still be considered good or to conceive of this as something other than a harm, is to misunderstand what is meant by the word good. 

If a word can be applied to describe any conceivable state of affairs, it is meaningless.  Given that Muslims apply the words 'good' and 'just' to Allah's actions without consideration of what these actions may be, they apply these terms incorrectly, without regard to their meaning.  They thus render them meaningless.  Such nihilism in regards to basic ethical terms (one shared by many fundamentalist Christians and others), once it seeps into the deep structure of a mind, prepares it to commit horrors.

Response to Ghilan on Evolution

A couple of months ago, Mohamed Ghilan published a blog post in response to a conference in the UK entitled “Have Muslims Misunderstood Evolution?” I have take issue with his characterizations of atheists, his description of the history of epistemology in Western philosophy, and his depiction of the context and function of evolution in the history of ideas.


We’ll start with his invocation of the trope of the ‘angry atheist.’  This is simply insult, not rational argument.  There are, of course, many intellectuals who have taken upon themselves the education of the public about evolutionary theory.  They have published many books, given many lectures.  The tone of these materials is generally calm and professional.  There is sometimes exasperation, but this tends to be caused by the fondness with which Creationists use out of context quotes to attempt to frame a narrative of  a ‘theory in crisis.’  One would expect that Ghilan would be the last person to stereotype another group of people as ‘angry.’  As it is, atheists do not hold violent protests outside of the Creation Museum nor do they call for the assassination of those who criticize evolution in the public square.  As we all know, the case is quite different when someone violates the ‘sanctity’ of the person of Muhammad.


Towards the beginning of the article, after the slurs, he notes:

“Everyone seems to want to talk about the evidence for or against it. No one is interested in the foundation that it’s built upon, and the subsequent logic and coherence of the theory itself.”

Given that the question is itself (in this particular case) whether it is in fact the case that humans share a common ancestor with all other living species, it is rather obvious that people would want to discuss the evidence for and against the proposition.  The problem for Ghilan, as he himself admits is that Muslims:

“proceed to point out whatever holes the theory has and what it doesn’t explain. Well, if history is any guide, those holes will be filled at some point as the theory goes through the normal scientific course of being re-worked, and some clever scientists will come eventually to explain those things that haven’t been explained”

Unable to win a case on the merits (i.e. the evidence), he proceeds to argue the technicalities.  He proceeds to give an adequate account of the difference between material and inferred evidence and provides a passable account of the various criteria a theory has to satisfy to be accepted as scientific (although I am a bit put off by his putting the words objective reality in scare quotes).

He assures us that “Material evidence presents no problems for Islam.”  Perhaps.  But that is primarily because what he calls material evidence (“ the hard data,” “observed phenomena”) does not tell us very much about the world unless it is integrated into an elaborated body of theory.

He begins his discussion of the underlying foundations of evolutionary theory with an overly-simplistic account of the history of epistemology in the Western world.  He informs us that

“What the Western intellectual crowd determined for itself was that all that exists is what we can touch, smell, feel, taste, hear, and see.”

This is, of course, completely false.  That western intellectual crowd, while holding a great diversity of philosophical views, does generally believe that things such as numbers, logical truths, and the past exist (although we can find exceptions to belief in each of these).

He continues:

“ There’s no such thing as pure reason. To be rational means to make empirically-verifiable statements. “

Again, completely false, as any first year student of philosophy could tell you. He completely ignores the analytic-synthetic distinction.   While it is true that deductive arguments do not reveal new truths about the external world, they do organize the truths we do know in new ways and draw out their implications.  As A. C. Grayling writes, “There is no logical novelty in the conclusion, though often enough there is psychological novelty” (The God Argument).  One cannot be rational if they ignore the results of sound deductive arguments that are relevant to what is being discussed.  He also caricatures Descartes skepticism.  I think Pierce said it best:

“We cannot begin with complete doubt. We must begun with all the prejudices which we actually have when we enter upon the study of philosophy. These prejudices cannot be dispelled by a maxim, for they are things which it does not occur to us can be questioned. Hence this initial skepticism will be mere self-deception, and not real doubt”

Descartes doubt was a thought-experiment through which he attempted to derive indubitable first principles on which he could build up an edifice of knowledge.  Once the foundation was set, empirical evidence could be accepted, analyzed, and employed.  The other rationalist philosophers thought similarly- a Platonic skepticism towards sense perception as a source of knowledge as such is not a prominent feature of modern rationalism.  Conversely, the empiricists did not deny the utility of ‘pure reason’ as exemplified by mathematics and formal logic in analyzing the data of sense perception.  They simply rejected the doctrine that the ultimate foundation of knowledge consists of a series of rationally intuited indubitable truths.  Instead, they posited the evidence of the senses as the foundation of knowledge.  The dispute did not consist of one side rejecting an entire avenue of knowledge that was accepted by the other- it was a debate over the ultimate foundations of or justification for knowledge.

By contrast, Ghilan tells us that “The Muslim approach was never an either/or in this extremist sense.”  There was, of course, no Muslim approach as such.  There were a diverse array of thinkers in the Muslim world who dealt with epistemology and they reached conclusions that were just as diverse as those in the west.  Al-Ghazali, for example, ultimately drew skeptical conclusions concerning both the use of the senses AND demonstrative reason, and was only released from his doubt  “by a light that God almighty cast into my breast, which is the key to the greater part of cognizance" (Deliverer from Error).  As for western approaches to overcoming this dichotomy, there have been many from Immanuel Kant’s categories of thought, through the American pragmatists such as Pierce and James, to the modern anti-foundationalist thinkers.

Ghilan then takes a card from the deck of the Christian creationists- he decides that the issue is not one of science but of religious worldviews.  He cites Dawkin’s oft-quoted (by fundamentalists) passage about Darwin making “it possible to be an intellectually fulfilled atheist” as evidence that “evolutionary theory is meant for” justifying atheism and that “major function of evolutionary theory... is to provide a pacifier for the reader who might have any inclinations to feeling any reverence towards anything metaphysical.”  This is belied by the actual historical facts concerning the genesis (if you pardon the pun) of the theory and by the numerous religious scientists who accept the theory because of its scientific merits, such as its fit with the empirical evidence its explanatory power, fruitfulness in generating research projects, and.  Darwin himself tells us in his Autobiography that “  Whilst on board the Beagle I was quite orthodox, and I remember being heartily laughed at by several of the officers (though themselves orthodox) for quoting the Bible as an unanswerable authority on some point of morality.... The old argument of design in nature, as given by Paley, which formerly seemed to me so conclusive, fails, now that the law of natural selection has been discovered” (p. 85-87).

Ultimately, the problem for Ghilan, as it is with creationists such as Phillip E. Johnson, is philosophical naturalism, described by the former as the “assumption that there is nothing beyond this physical realm, and “ that “give[s] a context to the combination of your material and inferred evidence.”  Once this is assumed, he admits that “you cannot escape having to accept evolutionary theory as an account for where things came from.”  Indeed.

Ghilan’s problem is that philosophical naturalism, in its epistemological form, is a necessary precondition for the scientific endeavor.  You cannot frame general laws and theories concerning the physical world which invoke entities that are not subject to the laws of that world and that can flout them at will.  Once you allow evil genies (ala Descartes) or gods and goddesses fudge the results by speeding up the decay rates of radioactive elements or tweaking the speed of light, you’ve said goodbye to any confidence you can have in general scientific theories concerning the past.

Besides this concern, it deserves mention that the existence of this physical realm is a shared assumption of common sense, scientific investigation, and the Abrahamic religions.  To move beyond it and assert the existence of a supernatural realm and to invoke supernatural explanations of natural phenomena is a step that needs to be argued for.  It is not basic in the same way as the assertion that the physical world exists.  Ghilan is correct that we cannot evaluate evidence without first principles- but not all first principles are created equal.

He makes the claim that:

“If one were to take all the assertions such as “this evolved from that to solve the problem of moving from water to land”, and restrict the material to just describing structure and function and pointing out the similarities without inducing relatedness, and classify based on similarity rather than “relatedness”, it wouldn’t all of a sudden be any less scientific.”

Besides demonstrating an extreme misunderstanding about evolutionary theory (features do not evolve to solve problems ala Lamarck- new features emerge which incidentally allow organisms to exploit new niches), Ghilan is omitting that science is, at heart, a theorizing activity that moves beyond the given evidence to infer explanations for that evidence which can then be tested in some manner or other. It is not, as Taner Edis put it in describing the peculiar view of science held by Muslim creationists,  “a set of practical applications and concrete facts to be collected and organized like stamps.”(An Illussion of Harmony)

He proceeds to create a farcical and condescending dialogue intended to show how close-minded and dogmatic atheists are, quotes a passage from two authors who are not actually denying the fact of evolution but rather the explanatory power of natural selection, and then embarks on a rant about “all the problems seeping from evolutionary theory” (which he does not describe), invoking (of course) Kuhn about all theory being data laden and in which he alludes to the “foundations” of “the science-worshipping militant new atheist crowd” being shook (how?), before ending on an appeal for Muslims to take up the study of traditional theology.  Yes, I’m sure that will work.

Beyond Irony, Beyond Islam

"A confession has to be part of your new life. -Wittgenstein"

Since starting this blog, I've come to realize that my I can no longer in good faith affirm that Islam is of supernatural origin.  From my studies, I have concluded that it is completely explicable in natural and cultural terms.  I do not see the Qur'an as a divine incursion into the natural world.  It is a human document.  It has poetic beauty and practical wisdom, as do many scriptures revered by one or another section of humanity.  Like these other scriptures, it also contains many things that are morally unacceptable and much that is simply factually incorrect, besides.  Despite that, I still appreciate many aspects of Muslim culture- I like eid, I appreciate the literature produced across time throughout the Muslim world.  I am still intensely interested in what is commonly termed 'Muslim' philosophy and in the Arabic language.  And I love the food. I will, as before, oppose racism, xenophobia, and social injustice, whether directed at Muslims or non-Muslims.  But I can no longer affirm the shahadatayn, I can no longer pray, and I can no longer observe the fast of Ramadan as anything other than a method of training the will and of learning deeper empathy for the needy.  Sadaqah is still a cardinal virtue, as any humanist will affirm. I will be taking time to detail some of my criticism in detail but this very brief statement will be sufficient for now.